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CAN'T STOMACH THE AMERICANS WITH
DISABILITIES ACT? HOW THE FEDERAL COURTS
HAVE GUTTED DISABILITY DISCRIMINATION
LEGISLATION IN CASES INVOLVING
INDIVIDUALS WITH GASTROINTESTINAL
DISORDERS AND OTHER HIDDEN ILLNESSES
Lawrence D. Rosenthal
I. INTRODUCTION
The Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA" or "the Act")' was meant,
in part, to help individuals with disabilities compete in the workplace.2 By
prohibiting employers from discriminating against individuals with
disabilities,' and by requiring employers to affirmatively accommodate
+ Lawrence D. Rosenthal is an Assistant Professor of Legal Writing at Northern Kentucky
University - Salmon P. Chase College of Law. Prior to joining the faculty at Northern
Kentucky University, he was the Associate Director of Research and Writing at Stetson
University College of Law in St. Petersburg, Florida. Professor Rosenthal earned his J.D. from
the Vanderbilt University Law School and his LL.M. from the Georgetown University Law
Center. Additionally, and of particular interest for purposes of this Article, Professor
Rosenthal was diagnosed with Crohn's disease in 1989 and continues to suffer from this illness.
The author would like to thank Ms. Angel Caracciolo, Ms. Alva Cross, Ms. Christine Pejot,
Ms. Stephanie Redding, and Mr. Roberto Zavaleta for their help with this Article. Portions of
this article are based on an article previously written by the author, Lawrence D. Rosenthal,
Requiring Individuals To Use Mitigating Measures in Reasonable Accommodation Cases After
the Sutton Trilogy: Putting the Brakes on a Potential Runaway Train, 54 S.C. L. REV. 421
(2002).
1. The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2000).
2. See id. § 12101(b). Although there are several titles in the Americans with
Disabilities Act, Title I of the ADA expressly prohibits employers from discriminating against
employees or potential employees with respect to hiring, firing, compensating, and providing
other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment. Id. § 12112(a).
3. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). Specifically, Section 12112(a) provides: "No covered entity
shall discriminate against a qualified individual with a disability because of the disability of
such individual in regard to job application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge
of employees, employee compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, and
privileges of employment." Id. See also Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-796
(2000). This Act applies to employers and programs receiving federal assistance. Id. The
substantive provision of the Rehabilitation Act provides the following:
No otherwise qualified individual with a disability in the United States .... shall,
solely by reason of her or his disability, be excluded from the participation in, be
denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or
activity receiving Federal financial assistance or under any program or activity
conducted by any Executive agency or by the United States Postal Service.
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individuals with disabilities, the ADA was a landmark piece of legislation
enacted to benefit the forty-three million Americans who suffered from
disabilities. However, the optimism that originally accompanied this Act'
has been shattered by the Supreme Court's decisions limiting ADA
coverage.6 Additionally, although some people with "obvious" disabilities
are still receiving some protection under the Act,7 it has become clear that
many people who have "hidden" illnesses are not benefitting from this
legislation."
Id. § 794(a).
4. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(1).
5. See President George H. Bush, Remarks of President George Bush at the Signing of
the Americans with Disabilities Act (July 26, 1990) available at
http://www.eeoc.gov/ada/bushspeech.html. At the signing of the ADA, President Bush
observed, "With today's signing of the landmark Americans for [sic] Disabilities Act, every
man, woman, and child with a disability can now pass through once-closed doors into a bright
new era of equality, independence, and freedom." Id.
6. See, e.g., Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Echazabal, 536 U.S. 73 (2002) (holding that an
employer is allowed to refuse to hire an individual if that individual poses a "direct threat" to
self); US Airways, Inc., v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391 (2002) (holding that an employer is not
required to violate its seniority system to accommodate an employee requesting a reasonable
accommodation); Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc., v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184 (2002) (holding that
when determining whether an individual is substantially limited in the ability to perform
manual tasks, the court must look at those tasks that are central to everyday life, and
commenting that there needs to be a "demanding standard" for a plaintiff to qualify as being
disabled); Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999) (holding that mitigating
measures must be taken into account when determining whether an individual suffers from a
disability under the Act); Murphy v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 527 U.S. 516 (1999) (following
Sutton and concluding that mitigating measures must be considered when determining
whether an individual suffers from a disability under the Act); Albertson's, Inc., v.
Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555 (1999) (holding that a body's internal mechanisms that compensate
for an individual's physical limitations must be evaluated when determining whether that
individual suffers from a disability under the Act).
7. See, e.g., Stone v. City of Mount Vernon, 118 F.3d 92 (2d Cir. 1997). In Stone, the
court found that genuine issues of material fact existed regarding whether the employer could
have accommodated a paralyzed firefighter by assigning him to a position within the fire
department that did not require fire suppression as an essential job function; therefore, the
court reversed the lower court's granting of summary judgment in favor of the employer. Id.
at 100-01.
8. See Ruth Colker, The Americans with Disabilities Act: A Windfallfor Defendants, 34
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 99 (1999) (noting the prevalence of pro-defendant outcomes under
the ADA); Ruth Colker, Winning and Losing under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 62
OHIO ST. L.J. 239 (2001) (comparing the success rates of plaintiffs and defendants in
employment discrimination cases). See also Kevin M. Clermont, Theodore Eisenberg, and
Stewart J. Schwab, Advantage to the Defendant: An Empirical Analysis of Employment
Discrimination Cases in the U.S. Courts, Presentation for the Association of American Law
Schools, Jan. 5, 2003 (demonstrating that plaintiffs who appeal pro-employer outcomes are
much less likely to prevail than defendants who appeal pro-employee outcomes); EEOC
Website at http://www.eeoc.gov/stats/ada-changes.html (last visited Oct. 1, 2003) (providing
information on the number of EEOC merit resolutions of ADA claims involving all types of
disabilities).
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One trend that has developed at all levels of the federal court system
demonstrates that individuals suffering from gastrointestinal disorders,
more specifically ulcerative colitis9 and Crohn's disease," have been
unsuccessful when pursuing claims under the ADA." These individuals
face a difficult position in that courts conclude either that they are not "sick
enough," and therefore do not have a disability under the ADA, or that
these individuals do have a disability, but are "too sick" to perform the
essential functions of their jobs with a reasonable accommodation."
Perhaps because these diseases are not accompanied by "obvious"
symptoms (such as blindness, deafness, or mobility impairments), and
perhaps because these employees are not seen as people with disabilities,
the sufferers of these "hidden" illnesses face an uphill battle when
attempting to pursue a disability-based discrimination claim. Despite the
"hidden" nature of these diseases, most of the people who suffer from these
illnesses need the protection of a federally legislated remedy such as the
ADA.
This Article will first address the nature of these "hidden" gastrointestinal
diseases and the various treatment options available to those who suffer
from them. The Article will then analyze many cases from the various
federal courts in which sufferers of these illnesses have attempted to use the
ADA or the Rehabilitation Act 13 to recover for the adverse employment
actions they experienced. This section of the Article focuses on the "not
sick enough" and "too sick" dilemmas.
After addressing the cases in which the plaintiffs were either "not sick
enough" or "too sick," the Article then highlights some of the other
9. See HARRISON'S PRINCIPLES OF INTERNAL MEDICINE 1679 (Eugene Braunwald et
al. eds., 15th ed. 2001) (1958) [hereinafter HARRISON'S] (stating that colitis is similar to
Crohn's disease and is classified as an inflammatory bowel disease). Unlike Crohn's disease,
which can occur anywhere within the gastrointestinal tract, colitis, as the name suggests, occurs
primarily in the colon and in the rectum. Id. at 1681.
10. See id., at 1679-81. This condition, along with ulcerative colitis, can be classified as an
inflammatory bowel disease, which affects any part of the gastrointestinal tract, but most
commonly exists in the small or the large intestine (or both). Id.
11. See Colker, A Windfall for Defendants, supra note 8; Colker, Winning and Losing
Under the A DA, supra note 8. This is not unique to individuals with gastrointestinal disorders.
See id. In fact, most ADA plaintiffs have not been successful when pursuing these claims. Id.
Additionally, even people diagnosed with colon cancer have not always experienced success
in pursuing their ADA claims. See Dinsdale v. Foresman-Addison Wesley, 10 ADA Cases
1400,2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12015 (N.D. Iowa Apr. 13, 2000).
12. See The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (2000). In
order to receive protection under the ADA, a plaintiff must not only suffer from a disability,
but he must also be a "qualified individual with a disability," which is defined as "an individual
with a disability who, with or without a reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential
functions of the employment position that such individual holds or desires." Id.
13. Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-796 (2000).
2004]
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problems these plaintiffs have faced when attempting to assert ADA
claims -problems which occurred either at the initial stage of the litigation
or after the plaintiffs had achieved some success at the lower court. Next,
this Article will address some cases in which plaintiffs with these illnesses
achieved some success, although for the most part, these successes occurred
at the very preliminary stages of litigation. Finally, this Article will suggest
some solutions to this problem and will reccommend how plaintiffs with
these gastrointestinal illnesses (and other "hidden" illnesses) could obtain
some type of legal relief.
This Article demonstrates that despite the initial optimism behind the
ADA, many of the people who need the protection of the Act have not
been able to access that relief. This Article's purpose is not to argue that
every individual with colitis, Crohn's disease, or any other "hidden" illness
is entitled to prevail on an ADA claim. However, this Article demonstrates
that people with these illnesses face an uphill battle when attempting to
apply for relief under the ADA, and that the current interpretation and
application of the ADA severely restrict the number of individuals who
achieve success under the Act. Unless, and until, either Congress acts to
limit the courts' conservative interpretation of the ADA, or the courts
change the pro-employer interpretation of the ADA, the "once-closed
doors" to which President Bush referred when signing the ADA into law
will remain closed and secured with a very strong lock.
14
II. A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF ULCERATIVE COLITIS AND CROHN'S
DISEASE
Although individuals suffer from many different types of gastrointestinal
disorders, this Article will focus on two major types of disorders that fall
under the category of inflammatory bowel diseases: ulcerative colitis and
Crohn's disease. Although both have similar symptoms, the two diseases
are very different. 5 Two traits they do share, however, are that both
diseases affect the victim's gastrointestinal tract, and both vary in severity
from mild to severe.16
The phrase "chronic intestinal inflammation" describes both diseases.
7
While colitis, as the name suggests, occurs in the colon,' Crohn's disease
14. See Bush, supra note 5.
15. HARRISON'S, supra note 9, at 1679-92.
16. Id. Although not typically fatal, some cases of Crohn's disease can result in death.
Id. at 1684. For example, in a case that received some press attention four years ago, the wife
of major league baseball player Graeme Lloyd died as a result of Crohn's disease. See Mike
Ulmer, Lloyd's Wife Loses Quiet Fight with Crohn 's, TORONTO SUN, Apr. 4, 2000, Sports sec.,
at 7.
17. HARRISON'S, supra note 9, at 1679.
18. Id. at 1681. Colitis can also affect the rectum. Id.
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can occur anywhere within the digestive tract, but most commonly arises in
the small intestine, the large intestine, or both.'9 Due to the nature of these
conditions, people suffering from colitis or Crohn's disease typically
experience abdominal pain, weight loss, fever, bleeding, persistent diarrhea,
and skin or eye irritations.2 ' These conditions normally are not curable,"
and sufferers of these conditions usually undergo one or more surgeries in
an attempt to alleviate their symptoms."
Although the exact number of people suffering from these illnesses is
unknown, some researchers conclude that as many as one million
Americans suffer from these two types of inflammatory bowel diseases.2-
Other estimates put the rate of ulcerative colitis at eleven out of every one
hundred thousand Americans, and the rate of Crohn's disease at seven out
24
of every one hundred thousand Americans.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 1682-84. Additionally, children with these illnesses can experience possible
delayed growth and sexual maturation. Introduction to Crohn's Disease, Crohn's & Colitis
Foundation of America, at http://www.ccfa.org/medinfo/medinfo/aboutcd.html (last visited
Oct. 2, 2003).
21. See Surgery for Crohn's Disease, Crohn's & Colitis Foundation of America, at
http://www.ccfa.org/medinfo/medinfo/surgerycd.html (last visited Oct. 2, 2003); Surgery for
Ulcerative Colitis, Crohn's & Colitis Foundation of America, at
http://www.ccfa.org/medinfo/medinfo/surgeryuc.html (last visited Oct. 2, 2003).
22. HARRISON'S, supra note 9, at 1690. See Surgery for Crohn's Disease, supra note 21;
Surgery for Ulcerative Colitis, supra note 21.
23. Introduction to Crohn's Disease, supra note 20.
24. HARRISON'S, supra note 9, at 1679. Research has indicated that the incidence rates
of these diseases vary with geography, ethnicity, socio-economic class, race, and whether an
individual smokes. Id. With respect to geography, countries located in the north, such as the
United States, the United Kingdom, and the Scandinavian countries have the highest rates of
these illnesses. Id. Unlike the previously identified countries and regions, southern European
countries, Australia, and South Africa have considerably lower rates of colitis and Crohn's
disease. Id. Additionally, these diseases are extremely rare in Asian and South American
countries. Id. In addition to geography, ethnicity and religion also appear to be variables
associated with these diseases. Id. For example, in the United States, Europe, and South
Africa, Jewish people have a two- to four-fold increase in the frequency of ulcerative colitis
and Crohn's disease. Id. Also, research has shown that the frequency of these illnesses is
lower in African-Americans, Hispanics, and Asians than it is in Caucasians. Id. Also, urban
areas have higher incidence rates than rural areas, while people in higher socio-economic
classes suffer from these diseases at a higher rate than individuals in lower socio-economic
classes. Id. These diseases also tend to affect family members, with higher incidence rates
among first-degree relatives and the children of parents with the diseases than among people
without a family link to these illnesses. Id. One other interesting fact about both of these
illnesses is that sufferers of both ulcerative colitis and Crohn's disease experience an increased
risk of colon cancer. Id. at 1691-92. See Hobson v. Raychem Corp., 73 Cal. App. 4th 614,619-
20 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999). In Hobson, the plaintiff alleged that her ulcerative colitis
"dramatically increases the risk of colon cancer." Id.
2004]
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Unfortunately for sufferers of colitis and Crohn's disease, the chances of
"curing" these conditions (especially Crohn's disease) are not good.25
Nonetheless, there are some treatment options available, ranging from
medication to surgery.26 Many of the medicines used to treat these diseases
have side effects themselves, and are thus not harmless forms of treatment.27
The following five types of medicine treat these diseases: (1)
corticosteroids; 28  (2) aminosalicylates; 29  (3) antibiotics; 31 (4)
25. See Surgery for Crohn's Disease, supra note 21; Surgery for Ulcerative Colitis, supra
note 21. One "cure" for ulcerative colitis is the complete removal of the colon and the rectum.
Id. Although this solves the patient's initial problem, this procedure can cause other
complications. Id.
26. HARRISON'S, supra note 9, at 1687-91.
27. Types of Medications, Crohn's & Colitis Foundation of America, at
http://www.ccfa.org/medinfo/medinfo/medications.html (last visited Oct. 2,2003). See Sutton
v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 482 (1999) (indicating that the side effects of
medications must be taken into account when determining whether an individual has a
disability under the Act). Specifically, the Court stated:
Looking at the Act as a whole, it is apparent that if a person is taking measures to
correct for, or mitigate, a physical or mental impairment, the effects of these
measures-both positive and negative-must be taken into account when judging
whether that person is "substantially limited" in a major life activity and thus
"disabled" under the Act.
Id.
28. Corticosteroids and aminosalicylates both work as anti-inflammatory agents to
control the symptoms of both colitis and Crohn's disease. Types of Medications, supra note
27. Patients take these medications either orally or rectally (in some cases, the corticosteroids
can be administered intravenously), and these medications have been successful in controlling
the symptoms of these diseases. See id. However, like many medications, these treatment
options do have side effects. Id. While the side effects of the aminosalicylates are not
particularly severe or dangerous, the side effects of the corticosteroids used to treat these
diseases can be extremely harmful. Id. Specifically, corticosteroids can result in osteoporosis,
cataracts, stretch marks, weight gain, diabetes, hypertension, and psychiatric symptoms. See,
e.g., Hardy v. Village of Piermont, 923 F. Supp. 604, 605-06 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (describing the
case of a plaintiff who used corticosteroids to treat her Crohn's disease and became unable to
perform the essential functions of her job as a police officer because the medication she used
caused severe weakness in both of her tibias, which prevented her from walking or running
long distances). Additionally, because it is dangerous to quickly stop using corticosteroids,
patients using corticosteroids need to be slowly weaned from these medications. Types of
Medications, supra note 27. As a result of these side effects of corticosteroids, many patients
are reluctant to use them. See Tangires v. The Johns Hopkins Hosp., 79 F. Supp. 2d 587 (D.
Md. 2000), affd, 230 F.3d 1354 (4th Cir. 2000) (determining that, because the plaintiff refused
to take the steroids prescribed to her on account of their potential side effects, the plaintiff did
not have a disability within the meaning of the ADA). Fortunately for victims of these
illnesses, there has been some development of a new class of corticosteroids. These new
medications do not have many of these dangerous side effects. Types of Medications, supra
note 27.
29. See supra note 28.
30. Types of Medications, supra note 27. Physicians prescribe antibiotics to control these
illnesses, despite the fact that researchers have not yet identified any particular infectious
agent that causes colitis or Crohn's disease. Id. These drugs, however, primarily treat Crohn's
[Vol. 53:449
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immunomodulators; and (5) biologic therapies." Physicians prescribe
these medications to induce and maintain remission, and to improve the
quality of a patient's life."
If none of the above-mentioned medical treatments is able to control the
effects of colitis or Crohn's disease, surgery remains an option. If a person
suffers from "extensive chronic" colitis, a fifty percent chance exists that he
will need surgery within ten years of the initial diagnosis." Various types of
surgeries treat both illnesses, ranging from removal of the entire colon and
rectum to the removal of part of the intestine and resecting the remaining
part. A complete removal of the colon and rectum requires the patient to
use an external appliance attached to his abdomen to collect the body's
waste;37 obviously, most patients do not find this option particularly• 31
appealing. In the second option, surgeons are able to create an internal
disease and not ulcerative colitis. Id. Like many other medications, antibiotics also have
unpleasant side effects. Id. Specifically, studies indicate that people taking these medications
experience nausea, headache, and loss of appetite. Id.
31. Id. The use of these drugs, which suppress the body's immune system, has
successfully treated people with colitis and Crohn's disease. Id. This treatment has been used
since the 1960s, again with some success and potentially harmful side effects. Id. Specifically,
the use of these drugs can cause bone marrow toxicity, infection, inflammation of the liver, and
lymphoma. Id. Additionally, because suppressed bone marrow can lead to low levels of
marrow-producing blood cells, patients on these medications typically must undergo
monitoring throughout their use of these drugs. Id.
32. Most recently, the Untied States Food and Drug Administration approved Infliximab,
which is the first biologic therapy for Crohn's disease. Id. This treatment, which is
administered intravenously, has achieved some success in treating active Crohn's disease,
without causing many negative side effects. Id. Although this type of medication has been
successful in treating Crohn's disease, not all suffers of the disease are able to afford this
treatment, which is extremely expensive and is administered in eight-week intervals. See
Williamson Group: New Drug Alert-Remicade, at http://www.williamsongroup.com/
newsl/view.asp?aID=797 (last visited Sept. 25, 2003). See also IV Infusion, Remicade for
Crohn's Disease, at http://www.remicade-crohns.com/remicade/infusion.jsp (last visited Sept.
25, 2003) (stating that the typical use of this drug involves three infusions in fairly rapid
succession, followed by maintenance infusions every eight weeks).
33. Types of Medications, supra note 27.
34. HARRISON'S, supra note 9, at 1690; Surgery for Crohn's Disease, supra note 21;
Surgery for Ulcerative Colitis, supra note 21.
35. HARRISON'S, supra note 9, at 1690.
36. HARRISON'S, supra note 9, at 1690; Surgery for Crohn's Disease, supra note 21
(stating that another potential option for people with Crohn's disease is strictureplasty, which
is a procedure that involves the widening of the narrowed intestinal channel); Surgery for
Ulcerative Colitis, supra note 21.
37. Surgery for Ulcerative Colitis, supra note 21.
38. See Pangalos v. Prudential Ins. Co., 5 AD Cases 1825, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15749
(E.D. Pa. Oct. 15, 1996). In Pangalos, the plaintiff, who suffered from severe ulcerative colitis,
refused to treat his condition through surgery because he did not want to have his colon
removed and be required to use an external appliance to collect waste. Id. at 1826.
20041
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pouch for the collection of waste, which eliminates the need for an external
appliance.' 9
As with any surgery, these treatment options present risks. Specifically,
there is a twenty percent morbidity rate for people who elect to have
surgery for colitis; a thirty percent morbidity rate for "urgent" colitis
surgery; and a forty percent morbidity rate for people who undergo
emergency surgery for this condition.4" The good news, however, for colitis
patients who do elect the surgery is that once the diseased organ is
removed, the symptoms of the disease typically end.4'
In the case of Crohn's disease, a few more surgical options exist.
However, because surgery does not cure Crohn's disease, and because
Crohn's disease typically resurfaces, surgeons usually remove only the part
of the intestine affected by the disease 2 With small intestine involvement,
the rate of required surgery is approximately eighty percent.43 With large
intestine involvement only, that rate slips down to fifty percent.4 Up to fifty
percent of those who have surgery need a second operation.
Despite the pain and inconvenience sufferers of colitis and Crohn's
disease endure, many of these individuals are left unprotected by legislation
intended to help individuals who need a level playing field in the
workplace.46 Specifically, as the cases that will be discussed below will
demonstrate, the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act have not resulted in
many successful outcomes for plaintiffs suffering from colitis or Crohn's
47disease. Unsuccessful outcomes occur either because the plaintiffs cannot
prove that they suffer from a "disability,"'4 or because they cannot
demonstrate that they can perform the essential functions of their jobs with
a reasonable accommodation.49 Because of this catch-22, the success rates
of plaintiffs stricken with colitis or Crohn's disease have been extremely
39. Surgery for Ulcerative Colitis, supra note 21.
40. HARRISON'S, supra note 9, at 1690.
41. See id. There is, however, a risk involved with people who elect to have the surgery
with the internal pouch. Id. Specifically, there is a possibility of bowel obstruction with this
procedure. Id. Additionally, there is a five to ten percent chance that a patient who
undergoes this type of surgery will eventually need to replace the internal pouch with an
external pouch due to "pouch failure." Id.
42. Surgery for Crohn's Disease, supra note 21.
43. HARRISON'S, supra note 9, at 1690.
44. Id.
45. Surgery for Crohn's Disease, supra note 21.
46. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)-(b) (2000).
47. See infra Part III.A-B.
48. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2).
49. See id. § 12111(8).
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disappointing to these individuals and to patient advocate groups.5 Even
more disheartening, however, is that individuals with these specific illnesses
are not the only plaintiffs having difficulty prevailing in ADA lawsuits, but
rather most ADA plaintiffs experience a similar predicament.'
III. THE CATCH-22 OF ADA PLAINTIFFS WITH GASTROINTESTINAL
DISORDERS AND OTHER "HIDDEN" ILLNESSES
Plaintiffs with gastrointestinal diseases such as ulcerative colitis and
Crohn's disease (and many other "hidden" illnesses) often find themselves
in a not-so-uncommon, and unenviable position. On one hand, they must
first prove they are "sick enough," and therefore have a "disability" within
the meaning of the ADA and/or the Rehabilitation Act, yet they must also
prove they are not "too sick," and can still perform the essential functionsS 52
of their jobs with a reasonable accommodation. If judged to be "not sick
enough," a plaintiff will not qualify as having a disability within the meaning
of the ADA.53 If, however, a plaintiff can prove he has a substantial
limitation on a major life activity (a "disability"), he must then prove that
he can still perform the essential functions of his job. 54 This catch-22 often
causes ADA and Rehabilitation Act plaintiffs with gastrointestinal diseases
to lose their cases on the merits, and often times very early early on in the
15litigation process.
ADA plaintiffs must first prove that they have a disability within the
meaning of the ADA 6 by showing that: (1) they suffer from a physical or
mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life
activities; 57 (2) they have a record of such an impairment;"' or (3) they are
regarded as having such an impairment. 9 Although the United States Code
defines "disability,' the Code of Federal Regulations defines the terms
50. See Colker, A Windfall for Defendants, supra note 8 (observing that most ADA cases
have resulted in pro-defendant outcomes); Colker, Winning and Losing Under the A DA, supra
note 8 (same).
51. Colker, A Windfallfor Defendants, supra note 8; Colker, Winning and Losing Under
the ADA, supra note 8.
52. § 12111(8). Specifically, not only must an ADA plaintiff demonstrate that he has a
disability, he must also prove that he is a "qualified individual with a disability." Id.
53. See infra Part III.A.
54. See infra Part III.B.
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that make up that definition: "impairment,, 61 "substantially limits," 62 and
"major life activity. ,63
Most ADA plaintiffs with colitis and Crohn's disease can satisfy the
definition of "physical or mental impairment '64 and typically identify a
"major life activity '65 impacted by such an impairment; it is the
"substantially limits" definition that causes these plaintiffs trouble when
trying to establish an ADA claim.66 As a result of several Supreme Court
decisions over the past few years, this hurdle has become even more
67
difficult to overcome.
Specifically, one issue federal courts considered during the 1990s was
whether to evaluate ADA plaintiffs with regard to the mitigating measures
they used to control their illnesses.68 The courts asked whether, when
determining disability status under the ADA, a plaintiff who uses a measure
61. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h) (2002). The C.F.R. defines a physical or mental impairment as:
(1) Any physiological disorder, or condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or anatomical
loss affecting one or more of the following body systems: neurological,
musculoskeletal, special sense organs, respiratory (including speech organs),
cardiovascular, reproductive, digestive, genito-urinary, hemic and lymphatic, skin,
and endocrine; or (2) Any mental or psychological disorder, such as mental
retardation, organic brain syndrome, emotional or mental illness, and specific
learning disabilities.
Id.
62. Id. § 1630.20). The C.F.R. defines "substantially limits" as:
(i) Unable to perform a major life activity that the average person in the general
population can perform; or (ii) Significantly restricted as to the condition, manner or
duration under which an individual can perform a particular major life activity as
compared to the condition, manner, or duration under which the average person in
the general population can perform that same major life activity.
Id. The EEOC also lists factors that should be considered when "determining whether an
individual is substantially limited in a major life activity." § 1630.20)(2). These factors include
"(i) [t]he nature and severity of the impairment; (ii) [t]he duration or expected duration of the
impairment; and (iii) [t]he permanent or long term impact, or the expected permanent or long
term impact of or resulting from the impairment." Id.
63. Id. § 1630.2(i). The C.F.R. provides examples as to what activities constitute major
life activities. Some of these examples include: "caring for oneself, performing manual tasks,
walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working." Id.
64. See id. § 1630.2(h).
65. See id. § 1630.2(i).
66. See id. § 1630.20).
67. See, e.g., Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999) (requiring
consideration of mitigating measures when determining whether an individual suffers from a
disability under the Act); Murphy v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 527 U.S. 516 (1999)
(following Sutton and concluding that mitigating measures must be considered when
determining whether an individual suffers from a disability under the Act); Albertson's, Inc. v.
Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555 (1999) (holding that a body's internal mechanisms that compensate
for an individual's physical limitations must be evaluated when determining whether that
individual suffers from a disability under the Act).
68. See Sutton, 527 U.S. at 475; Murphy, 527 U.S. at 521; Albertson's, 527 U.S. at 567.
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that ameliorates the effect of an impairment should be evaluated in his
corrected or uncorrected state. 69 After various United States Courts of
Appeals reached conflicting answers to this question, the Supreme Court
decided Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc.7 '
In Sutton, two sisters with severe myopia sued United Air Lines after
their employment applications were rejected because the plaintiffs were
unable to meet the airline's minimum vision requirements.7' In deciding
whether to consider mitigating measures when determining whether the
plaintiffs suffered from a disability under the ADA, the Court first turned
to the Act's definition of "disability."72 After observing that various federal
agencies had the responsibility for promulgating regulations for the various
titles of the Act,73 the Court found no agency had the responsibility for
promulgating regulations implementing the generally applicable provisions
of the Act, including the definition of the term "disability., 74 The Court
noted that the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC")
and the Attorney General had issued Interpretive Guidelines on this
specific issue, which favored ignoring mitigating measures when analyzing a
disability.75
The sisters in Sutton argued that the Court should rely on the agencies'
interpretations because the Act did not directly address the issue of whether
to consider mitigating measures, and also because the EEOC's and
16Attorney General's opinions were not inconsistent with the Act. United
argued that the Court owed no deference to the agencies' interpretations
because the Act's plain meaning conflicted with those interpretations.77
United persuaded the Court that the plain meaning of the Act conflicted
with the agency interpretation, and that courts must take mitigating
69. See Sutton, 527 U.S. at 475; Murphy, 527 U.S. at 521; Albertson's, 527 U.S. at 567.
70. Sutton, 527 U.S. 471 (1999). Parts of the following case descriptions are taken from
an earlier article, Lawrence D. Rosenthal, Requiring Individuals To Use Mitigating Measures
in Reasonable Accommodation Cases After the Sutton Trilogy: Putting the Brakes on a
Potential Runaway Train, 54 S.C. L. REV. 421,440-43 (2002).
71. Rosenthal, supra note 70, at 440 (citing Sutton, 527 U.S. at 475-76).
72. Id. at 441 (citing Sutton, 527 U.S. at 478); see 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (2000).
73. Rosenthal, supra note 70, at 441 (citing Sutton, 527 U.S. at 478-79). The EEOC had
the responsibility for promulgating regulations regarding the employment-related aspects of
the Act, while the Attorney General had the responsibility for promulgating regulations
regarding the Act's public services provisions. Id. at 441 n.128 (citing Sutton, 527 U.S. at 478).
74. Id. (citing Sutton, 527 U.S. at 479).
75. Id. at 441-42 (citing Sutton, 527 U.S. at 479-80). The Court noted that according to the
EEOC Guidelines, "the determination of whether an individual is substantially limited in a
major life activity must be made on a case by case basis, without regard to mitigating measures
such as medicines, or assistive or prosthetic devices." Id. at 441-42 n.130 (citing Sutton, 527
U.S. at 480).
76. Id. at 442 (citing Sutton, 527 U.S. at 481).
77. Id. (citing Sutton, 527 U.S. at 481-82).
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measures into consideration when determining whether an individual
suffers from a disability.7"
The Court's conclusion was based on three separate provisions of the
Act.79 The Court initially looked at the phrase "substantially limits" and
determined that because Congress drafted that phrase in the present
indicative verb form, Congress intended it to cover only people who are
presently (not potentially or hypothetically) substantially limited."" Next,
the Court addressed the Act's requirement that the definition of "disability"
be evaluated "with respect to an individual."8  The Court reached a pro-
employer conclusion by determining that because the Act focused on the
individual-rather than on a specific diagnosis- the Act required the
evaluation of the effect of mitigating measures on the ADA plaintiff. 2
Finally, the Court looked to the Congressional finding that "some
43,000,000 Americans" suffer from disabilities, and concluded that Congress
must have intended to take mitigating measures into account, or the
number referenced would have been much higher.83 Because the plaintiffs
in Sutton could have corrected their vision impairments with corrective
lenses, the Court concluded that they did not have impairments that
substantially limited their major life activities; therefore, they were not
actually disabled under the Act. 4
The Court also addressed the "regarded as" prong of the disability
definition, 8 and concluded that the plaintiffs did not qualify as being
regarded as substantially limited in the major life activity of working.86 The
78. Id. (citing Sutton, 527 U.S. at 482).
79. Id. (citing Sutton, 527 U.S. at 482).
80. Id. (citing Sutton, 527 U.S. at 482-83).
81. Id. (citing Sutton, 527 U.S. at 483-84).
82. Id. (citing Sutton, 527 U.S. at 483-84).
83. Id. (citing Sutton, 527 U.S. at 484-87). The Court noted that the corresponding
finding in the 1988 forerunner to the ADA was drawn from a report by the National Council
on Disability. Id. (citing Sutton, 527 U.S. at 484-88 (citing Robert L. Burgdorf, The Americans
with Disabilities Act: Analysis and Implications of a Second-Generation Civil Rights Statute, 26
HARV. C. R.-C. L. L. REV. 413, 434 n.117 (1991)). The Court also noted that in 1988, the
National Council on Disability issued a report that stated approximately thirty-seven million
individuals suffered from a "functional limitation." Id. (citing NATIONAL COUNCIL ON
DISABILITY, ON THE THRESHOLD OF INDEPENDENCE 17 (1988), available at
http://www.ncd.gov/newsroom/publications/threshold.html)).
84. Id. (citing Sutton, 527 U.S. at 488-89).
85. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(C) (2000).
86. Rosenthal, supra note 70, at 442-43 (citing Sutton, 527 U.S. 489-90). The Court noted
that the petitioners only alleged that they were regarded as being substantially limited in the
major life activity of working, and did not argue that they were regarded as being substantially
limited in the major life activity of seeing. Id. at 443 n.140 (citing Sutton, 527 U.S. at 490). The
Court noted that the petitioners failed to make this "obvious argument," but refrained from
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Court reached this conclusion based in part on the high burden of proof
required of the plaintiff.87 The Court therefore affirmed the Tenth Circuit's
judgment.
On the same day it decided Sutton, the Court decided Murphy v. United
Parcel Service, Inc.,"" the second case in the Sutton trilogy. 9 In Murphy, the
Court ruled in favor of the defendant-employer, concluding that the
determination of whether an individual has an impairment that substantially
limits a major life activity must take into account the plaintiff's mitigating
measures.9 The concluding case in the Sutton trilogy is Albertson's, Inc. v.
Kirkingburg.9' In Albertson's, the Court concluded that courts must
consider internal mechanisms the body develops for coping with an
impairment when determining whether an individual suffers from a
disability within the meaning of the ADA.92
The ramifications of this trilogy of cases dishearten many potential and
actual ADA plaintiffs, including those who suffer from ulcerative colitis and
Crohn's disease. Under the Court's reasoning, if individuals take the
available medications, they will most likely lose ADA protection because
they will not be "sick enough" to satisfy the definition of "disability" under
the Act. If, however, these plaintiffs do not take the available medication,
they lose ADA protection because they will be "too sick" to perform the
essential functions of their job.93 Still, other courts might find plaintiffs who
are not using mitigating measures are still not "sick enough," evaluating
them as if they were taking medication. 94 Finally, because surgery presents
an available option for individuals who suffer from these illnesses, some
commenting on the argument's probability of success. Id. at 443 n.140 (citing Sutton, 527 U.S.
at 490).
87. Id. at 443 (citing Sutton, 527 U.S. at 491-94). Justices Stevens and Breyer dissented.
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Stevens argued that the plaintiffs in Sutton did have a
disability covered by the ADA. Id. at n.142 (citing Sutton, 527 U.S. at 513). Justice Stevens's
reasoning was based on the Act's legislative history and on the fact that the executive agencies
charged with interpreting the Act agreed that mitigating measures should not be considered
during the disability determination analysis. Id. at n.142 (citing Sutton, 527 U.S. at 499-503
(Stevens, J., dissenting)).
88. 527 U.S. 516 (1999).
89. Rosenthal, supra note 70, at 448.
90. Id. (citing Murphy, 527 U.S. at 518-519).
91. Id. at 450 (citing Albertson's, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555 (1999)).
92. Albertson's, 527 U.S. at 565-66.
93. See The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990,42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (2000). To
receive ADA protection, an individual must not only have a disability, but must also be a
"qualified individual with a disability." Id.
94. See Rosenthal, supra note 70, at 444-46. See also Tangires v. The Johns Hopkins
Hosp., 79 F. Supp. 2d 587 (D. Md. 2000), aff'd, 230 F.3d 1354 (4th Cir. 2000) (holding that the
plaintiff did not have a disability because, had she used the available mitigating measure, her
impairment would not have substantially limited any major life activities).
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courts in the future might find against these plaintiffs because sufferers of
these illnesses can "cure" their disease through surgery.95
A. The "You're Not Sick Enough" Cases
Although the initial disability determination occurs on a case-by-case
basis, and the plaintiff's actual diagnosis is not determinative of whether
that individual satisfies the definition of "disability," 96 most ADA plaintiffs
with ulcerative colitis or Crohn's disease have been unable to prove they
have a "disability" within the meaning of the ADA or the Rehabilitation
Act. In both the federal trial courts and the federal appellate courts,
sufferers of colitis and Crohn's disease are repeatedly being found to be not
"sick enough," and therefore not considered disabled under the ADA or
Rehabilitation Act. As a result, they are being left unprotected by this
legislation.
In Cotter v. Ajilon Services, Inc. ,9 the United States Court of Appeals for
the Sixth Circuit concluded that the plaintiff, who was suffering from colitis
and was forced to spend time in the hospital as a result of his illness 98 did
not establish that he was disabled within the meaning of the ADA.99 In
Cotter, the plaintiff worked for a temping agency and was diagnosed with
ulcerative colitis near the time the defendant hired him.1 0 Two years after
his initial hire, the plaintiff collapsed and was hospitalized as a result of his
95. Pangalos v. Prudential Ins. Co., 5 AD Cases 1825,1827,1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15749
(E.D. Pa. October 15, 1996) (noting the possibility that because the plaintiff could have
"cured" his colitis with surgery, he did not have a disability under the ADA).
96. The following cases all stand for the proposition that the determination of whether an
ADA plaintiff has a disability within the meaning of the Act should be made on a case-by-case
basis: Pollard v. High's of Baltimore, Inc., 281 F.3d 462,468 (4th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 537
U.S. 827 (2002); Cotter v. Ajilon Serv's., Inc., 287 F.3d 593, 598 (6th Cir. 2002); Bristol v. Bd.
of County Comm'rs, 281 F.3d 1148,1156 (10th Cir. 2002); Navarro v. Pfizer Corp., 261 F.3d 90,
104 (1st Cir. 2001); Tice v. Centre Area Transp. Auth., 247 F.3d 506,515 (3d Cir. 2001); Mason
v. United Air Lines, Inc., 274 F.3d 314, 317 (5th Cir. 2001); Lawson v. CSX Transp., Inc., 245
F.3d 916,923 (7th Cir. 2001); Mathieu v. Gopher News Co., 273 F.3d 769,775 (8th Cir. 2001);
Thornton v. McClatchy Newspapers, Inc., 261 F.3d 789,794 (9th Cir. 2001); Waddell v. Valley
Forge Dental Assocs., Inc., 276 F.3d 1275, 1284 (1 lth Cir. 2001); Schaefer v. State Ins. Fund,
207 F.3d 139, 143 (2d Cir. 2000).
97. 287 F.3d 593 (6th Cir. 2002).
98. Id. at 596. Although the court did not give the specifics of the physical manifestations
of the disease, and how those manifestations affected the plaintiff, it did define the disease as
"an intestinal ailment which has no known cure but may be controlled by medication, a proper
diet, exercise, and adequate rest." Id.
99. Id. at 601.
100. Id. at 595-96.
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disease."" After the plaintiff received clearance to return to work full-time,
his employer discharged him for "lack of work. ' '""
After his termination, the plaintiff sued his former employer, alleging
violations of the ADA and the equivalent Michigan state anti-
discrimination statute.0 3 The lower court granted the employer's motion for
summary judgment, and the plaintiff appealed, arguing that there were
genuine issues of material fact regarding whether he suffered from a
disability within the meaning of the ADA."" Not surprisingly, the Sixth
Circuit began its analysis with an explanation of the relevant statutory
provisions and sections from the Code of Federal Regulations.0 5 The Sixth
Circuit discussed the definitions of "disability" and "substantially limits,"
and discussed the relevant sections of the Code of Federal Regulations that
indicate the factors courts should examine when determining disability
status."'6
After addressing these definitions and regulations, the Sixth Circuit noted
the need for a fact specific inquiry, and that courts must consider mitigating
measures, such as medications, when determining whether an individual
suffers from a disability within the meaning of the ADA."'7 The court next
applied a three-step approach used to determine whether an individual
suffers from a disability, an approach which asks: (1) whether the plaintiff
suffers from an impairment; (2) whether the activity limited by the
impairment qualifies as a "major life activity;" and (3) whether the
impairment "substantially limits" the major life activity.'08 The court then
attempted to apply this test to the facts presented before it.'09
Unfortunately, the only evidence the plaintiff provided was what the
court deemed a "perfunctory statement" that he was substantially limited in
his ability "to perform manual tasks such as lifting, bending, standing, and
101. Id. at 596. Additionally, the plaintiff was forced to take various leaves of absence to
cope with his illness. Id.
102. Id. This discharge occurred approximately three-and-a-half years after the plaintiff's
original hiring date. Id. at 595-96.
103. Id. at 595. The equivalent state anti-discrimination statute was Michigan's Persons
with Disabilities Civil Rights Act. Id.; MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 37-1101-37.1607 (West 2001).
104. Cotter, 287 F.3d at 595.
105. Id. at 597-98.
106. Id. at 597 (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 12102(2), 12111(8) (2000); and 29 C.F.R. §§
1630.2(j)(1), (2) (2002)).
107. Id. at 598. The court relied on Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999),
for requiring consideration of mitigating measures when determining disability status. Cotter,
287 F.3d at 598.
108. Cotter, 287 F.3d at 598. See Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624,625 (1998) (holding that
the plaintiff's asymptomatic HIV-positive status was a disability under the ADA). The
Supreme Court approved this three-step approach in this case. Id. at 631.
109. Cotter, 287 F.3d at 598-99.
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carrying things.""" The plaintiff also presented evidence that his doctor
ordered him to take frequent breaks at work and to avoid stress, which the
court interpreted as an attempt by the plaintiff to demonstrate that he was
substantially limited in his ability to work."' The Sixth Circuit found that
the plaintiff's ability to obtain and maintain a job shortly after his
termination proved that he was not substantially limited in his ability to
work and agreed that the plaintiff failed to present enough evidence to
prove a substantial limitation on any other major life activity.' Therefore,
the plaintiff failed in his attempt to prove he had an actual disability under
the first prong of the ADA's definition."'
The plaintiff then attempted to prove that he was regarded as being
substantially limited in the major life activity of working under the ADA."
4
The Sixth Circuit concluded that the plaintiff was unable to meet the
ADA's rigorous burden of proof."5 Specifically, because the plaintiff was
unable to show that his former employer believed he was substantially
limited in his ability to participate in a broad class of jobs (rather than in
one particular job), the Sixth Circuit ultimately rejected the plaintiff's
"regarded as" claim under the ADA.' 6
Other United States Courts of Appeals have also determined that a
person suffering from ulcerative colitis or Crohn's disease does not
necessarily qualify as an individual with a disability under the ADA. For
example, in Ryan v. Grae & Rybicki, P.C.,"' the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit concluded that the plaintiff, who suffered
from a rather severe case of colitis, did not meet the ADA's disability
definition."" In Ryan, the plaintiff worked as a legal secretary in the
defendant law firm 9 and was diagnosed with colitis approximately eight
months after she began in this position.2" As a result of her condition, she
110. Id. at 598.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 598-99.
113. Id. In any ADA action, the plaintiff has three options to try to prove he suffers from
a disability; he can attempt to show either (A) a physical or mental impairment that
substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such individual; (B) a record of
such an impairment; or (C) being regarded as having such an impairment. 42 U.S.C. §
12102(2) (2000).
114. Cotter, 287 F.3d at 599.
115. Id. at 600-01.
116. Id. The Sixth Circuit therefore affirmed the lower court's granting of summary
judgment in favor of the defendant. Id. at 595, 601.
117. 135 F.3d 867 (2d Cir. 1998).
118. Id. at 868, 873. As a result of this conclusion, the Second Circuit affirmed the lower
court's granting of summary judgment in the employer's favor. Id. at 873.
119. Id. at 868.
120. Id.
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experienced various physical symptoms such as "frequent and painful
diarrhea, stomach cramps, and rectal bleeding. 1 2' The court described this
last symptom as "heavy" and described the stomach pain as "severe.' ' 22 It
was also clear that the plaintiff ran the risk of soiling herself if she was not
able to get to a restroom within ten seconds from the onset of an attack.'
23
Approximately one year after the plaintiff started working, the defendant
terminated the plaintiff's employment, alleging poor performance. 24 The
plaintiff exhausted her administrative remedies and eventually filed a
lawsuit accusing her employer of violating the ADA and the equivalent
New York state anti-discrimination statute.12  The Second Circuit first
explained the process a court must follow when determining whether an
individual suffers from a disability within the meaning of the ADA. 26
Specifically, the Second Circuit focused on the definitions of "disability,"




The court first addressed the "major life activities" and the "substantially
limits" aspects of the case. It referenced the Code of Federal Regulations,
which provided examples of major life activities and also defined the term
"substantially limits.' ' 129 The plaintiff argued that she was substantially
limited in the major life activity of controlling the elimination of her
121. Id. The court also observed that the plaintiff "suffered through" nearly a constant
cycle of three or four days of constipation, followed by the same period of "erratic, bloody,
and painful diarrhea." Id.
122. Id. at 869. Additionally, on at least one occasion, the plaintiff was hospitalized
because of her condition. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 869.
125. Id. The state equivalent is the New York State Human Rights Law, N.Y. EXEC. LAW
§§ 290-301 (McKinney 2001). The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
New York granted the employer's motion for summary judgment, concluding that (1) the
plaintiff did not have a disability under the ADA, and (2) even if the plaintiff was able to meet
the disability definition, the employer terminated the plaintiff's employment for a legitimate,
non-discriminatory reason. Ryan, 135 F.3d at 869. On appeal, the defendant argued only that
the plaintiff did not suffer from a disability within the meaning of the ADA, and that she was
therefore not entitled to the Act's protection. Id. at 870.
126. See Ryan, 135 F.3d at 870; Cotter v. Ajilon Servs., Inc., 287 F.3d 593, 598 (6th Cir.
2002).
127. Ryan, 135 F.3d at 870. While conceding that the plaintiff did indeed suffer from an
impairment, the defendant argued that this impairment did not substantially limit the plaintiff
in any major life activities, and that the firm did not regard the plaintiff as being substantially
limited in any major life activities. Id.
128. Id. at 870-72.
129. Id. at 870 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1) (2000)). The court referred to the factors
to be weighed in making the determination of whether an impairment substantially limits a
major life activity, including the "nature and severity of the impairment," "the duration or
expected duration of the impairment," and "the permanent or long-term impact of the
impairment." Id. (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(2)).
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waste. 30 Although the Code of Federal Regulations does not list this
specific activity as an example of a major life activity, the court assumed
that eliminating waste did constitute a major life activity.'31 However, the
court reached the conclusion that the plaintiff was not substantially limited
in this major life activity after applying the three factors set out in the Code
of Federal Regulations.
First, the court addressed the nature and severity of the impairment and
found that this factor weighed in favor of finding a substantial limitation.1
33
The court reasoned that because the impairment went "to the very heart of
her ability to control the elimination of waste," the impairment was indeed
severe.34 Next, the court analyzed the duration, or expected duration, of
the impairment. 35 After acknowledging that this factor "arguably cut[] both
ways," the court ultimately concluded that the factor cut against a finding of
a substantial limitation.' 36 The court noted that although the disease was
incurable and therefore had a long-term duration, the disease was not
always symptomatic, and in fact the plaintiff often enjoyed extended
periods of remission. 137 Additionally, the court observed that the plaintiff
suffered severe attacks of her disease only in the summer months,
suggesting that during the non-summer months, the disease did not affect
her.
38
Finally, the court addressed the "expected long term impact resulting
from the impairment.', 39 The Second Circuit concluded that this factor
weighed against a finding that the plaintiff's colitis substantially limited
her. 40 The court reasoned that although the plaintiff would forever be
diagnosed with colitis, the sporadic nature of the disease, along with its
seasonal effect, warranted a finding that the plaintiff was not substantially
limited. 141
130. Id. at 870-71. Although controlling the elimination of waste is not listed in the Code
of Federal Regulations as a major life activity, the Second Circuit noted that the list in the
C.F.R. is not all-inclusive. Id. at 870.
131. Id. at 871.
132. Id. See also supra note 129.




137. Id. In fact, the court noted that the plaintiff had recently enjoyed an eighteen-month
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After finding no genuine issue of fact regarding a substantial limitation on
the plaintiff's ability to eliminate her waste, the court then addressed
whether her condition substantially limited her ability to care for herself.
142
Using the same three-factor analysis, the Second Circuit concluded that it
did not; therefore, the court found that the plaintiff was not disabled under
the Act.
143
The United States Courts of Appeals are not the only courts looking
skeptically at sufferers of colitis or Crohn's disease bringing claims under
the ADA. Numerous federal district courts have also ruled against these
plaintiffs, finding them unable to prove that they are "sick enough" to be
substantially limited in any major life activities, and thus "disabled" under
the ADA.'"
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York
was one such court to address this ADA issue.14 In Sacay v. The Research
Foundation of the City University of New York, the plaintiff suffered from a
number of ailments, including colitis. 146 After the plaintiff's employer
eliminated the plaintiff's position, the plaintiff sued various defendants on
various grounds, including violations of the ADA, the Rehabilitation Act,
and the state anti-discrimination statute . 47 After disposing of many of the
142. Id. Unlike the "elimination of waste," "caring for oneself" is listed in the Code of
Federal Regulations as a major life activity. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i) (2002).
143. Ryan, 135 F.3d at 871-72. The court determined that the plaintiff was able to dress
and groom herself and make her way to work, even when her colitis was symptomatic. Id. at
871-72. Additionally, the plaintiff enjoyed extended periods of being asymptomatic. Id. at
872. Finally, the fact that she had to be near a restroom or risk soiling herself did not lead the
court to conclude that the plaintiff was substantially limited in the major life activity of caring
for herself. Id. at 871-72. The plaintiff also attempted to convince the court that her employer
regarded her as being substantially limited in a major life activity. See id. at 872. Specifically,
the plaintiff alleged that her employer regarded her as being substantially limited in her ability
to work. Id. Because the plaintiff's employer offered to provide her with good references, and
because the plaintiff failed to present evidence that her employer perceived her as being
incapable of performing a broad class of jobs due to her impairment, the Second Circuit
quickly disposed of that argument. Id. at 872-73. Despite finding that the plaintiff involved in
this case did not suffer from a disability, the Second Circuit did indicate that this conclusion
should not be read to mean that colitis can never be considered a disability; the facts of each
case are what determine whether a plaintiff can establish whether colitis is a disability in each
particular case. Id. at 872. This is consistent with opinions from other United States Courts of
Appeals. E.g., Cotter v. Ajilon Servs., Inc., 287 F.3d 593, 598 (6th Cir. 2002).
144. See Sacay v. Research Found. of City Univ. of N.Y., 193 F. Supp. 2d 611 (E.D.N.Y.
2002); Johnson v. N.Y. Med. Coll., No. 95 CIV. 8413 (JSM), 1997 WL 580708 (S.D.N.Y. Sept.
18,1997); Branch v. City of New Orleans, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18254 (E.D. La. Dec. 14,
1994).
145. Sacay v. The Research Foundation of the City University of New York, 193 F. Supp.
2d 611 (E.D.N.Y. 2002).
146. Id. at 615, 619.
147. Id. at 615. The plaintiff also sued under the New York City Human Rights Law,
Administrative Code of the City of New York § 8-107. Sacay, 193 F. Supp. 2d at 615, 630.
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plaintiff's claims on Eleventh Amendment immunity grounds, the court
addressed the merits of the plaintiff's ADA and Rehabilitation Act
claims.148
Specifically, the court considered whether the plaintiff was substantially
limited in her ability to eliminate waste. 49 As the Second Circuit did in
Ryan, the Sacay court assumed, without deciding, that eliminating waste
was indeed a major life activity but held that the plaintiff was unable to
prove that she was substantially limited in that activity.'50 The court based
this conclusion on the plaintiff's evidence that she was diagnosed with
irritable bowel syndrome,' and the fact that she failed to present evidence
about the severity or the expected duration of the illness. Ultimately, the
court concluded that "[t]he medical evidence nowhere suggests that [the
plaintiff's] colitis was sufficiently severe to substantially limit her major life
activities."' 53  The court determined the plaintiff's symptoms were
insufficient to warrant a finding of a disability, especially because her
condition improved with medication and rest. 1
4
The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York
also ruled against an ADA plaintiff with colitis when it decided Johnson v.
New York Medical College.155 In Johnson, the plaintiff suffered from colitis
and depression and eventually sued her employer for allegedly violating the
ADA and the equivalent state anti-discrimination statute. 56  Not
surprisingly, the court began its ADA analysis by deciding whether the
148. Sacay, 193 F. Supp. 2d at 624-25. The court first dismissed the plaintiff's claim that
she was substantially limited in her ability to perform certain major life activities not
associated with her gastrointestinal problems, and the court then considered whether the
plaintiff was able to satisfy the definition of disability based on her gastrointestinal illness. Id.
at 625-29.
149. Id. at 628.
150. Id. at 628-29.
151. Id. at 629. Although irritable bowel syndrome is not the same as ulcerative colitis,
throughout the opinion, the court used both terms to describe the plaintiff's condition. Id. at
628-29.
152. Id. at 629. Also, the plaintiff only argued that she needed to be near a bathroom to
avoid soiling herself, something the court did not find to be substantially limiting. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id. The court's reference to the positive effect of the plaintiff's medication on her
condition was consistent with the Supreme Court's opinion in Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc.
that a plaintiff's illness must be evaluated with respect to mitigating measures. 527 U.S. 471,
482 (1999). In granting the employer's ADA summary judgment motion, the court also
determined that granting the employer's motion for summary judgment under the
Rehabilitation Act was appropriate. Sacay, 193 F. Supp. 2d at 630.
155. No. 95, CIV. 8413 (JSM), 1997 WL 580708 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 18, 1997).
156. Id. at *1-2. The state statute under which the plaintiff sued was N.Y. EXEC. LAW §§
290-301 (McKinney 2001).
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plaintiff suffered from an impairment.17 The court concluded that the
plaintiff's colitis was indeed an impairment within the meaning of the Act
and next addressed whether that impairment substantially limited any of the
plaintiff's major life activities.'" The plaintiff alleged that her colitis
substantially limited her major life activities of working and having sex." 9
After looking at the nature and severity of the plaintiff's impairment, its
duration or expected duration, and its long-term or expected long-term
impact, the court concluded that the plaintiff did not present an issue of fact
as to whether she was substantially limited in her ability to work.' 
6
1
Specifically, the court observed that at her deposition, the plaintiff
admitted that her condition did not affect her ability to work, and that she
could not recall any days where she was unable to work due to her
condition.16' The plaintiff further admitted that even when her condition
was active (the plaintiff experienced times during which her condition was
not active), she was able to go to work and perform other functions, and she
only needed to be near a bathroom. 62 The court observed that although the
plaintiff experienced accidents on two occasions, these did not cause the
plaintiff's condition to be classified as a substantial limitation on her ability
to work. 63 In reaching this conclusion, the court relied on several other
courts for the proposition that colitis was not a disability under the Act.
'64
After dismissing the plaintiff's contention that she was substantially
limited in her ability to work, the court quickly dismissed the plaintiff's
alternative allegations that she was substantially limited in her ability to
have sex, and that sex was a major life activity.16 ' The court concluded that
157. Johnson, No. 95, CIV. 8413 (JSM), 1997 WL 580708 at *5.
158. Id.
159. Id. With respect to the major life activity of working, because a plaintiff must
demonstrate a limitation in performing a class of jobs rather than one specific job, attempting
to win with this argument on an ADA claim is quite difficult. Id.
160. Id. at *5-6.
161. Id. at *6.
162. Id. The court also noted that the plaintiff was able to drive thirty-five to forty
minutes to work each day, only pulling over to use a restroom on a few occasions. Id. And,
even on those occasions, the plaintiff was still able to report to work. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id. (citing Ryan v. Grae & Rybicki, P.C., 135 F.3d 867 (2d Cir. 1998); Branch v. City
of New Orleans, No. 93-1273, 1995 WL 295320 (E.D. La. May 8, 1995); Caporilli v. City of
Rome, New York, No. 85 CV. 1320,1992 WL 209327 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 13,1992). The court did
this even though the disability determination should be made on a case-by-case basis, taking
into account how the impairment actually affected the person suffering from it, and not solely
on the basis of the diagnosis and how other courts have regarded the illness. E.g., Sutton v.
United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471,483 (1999); Cotter v. Ajilon Servs., Inc., 287 F.3d 593,598
(6th Cir. 2002).
165. Johnson, 1997 WL 580708, at *6.
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the plaintiff's reliance on Abbott v. Bragdon'66 and Pacourek v. Inland Steel
Co. 167 was misplaced because those cases did not, as the plaintiff contended,
stand for the proposition that sex was a major life activity. 68 The court
therefore concluded that the plaintiff's colitis did not reach the level of a
disability under the ADA.169
In one of the earlier ADA cases involving a plaintiff with a
gastrointestinal disease, the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Louisiana concluded that the plaintiff was not entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law on the issue of whether her colitis reached the
level of a disability under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act.70
Specifically, in Branch, the court concluded that "a jury could reasonably
conclude" that the plaintiff's ailment was not a disability under the ADA or
the Rehabilitation Act, and the court therefore denied the plaintiff's Rule
50 motion for judgment as a matter of law on this issue.
17
In Branch, the plaintiff suffered from severe ulcerative colitis and sued
her former employer for terminating her employment.' Addressing the
propriety of the plaintiff's Rule 50 motion on the issue of whether she
suffered from a disability, the court undertook the three-step process used
to determine disability status.173 The court first implicitly concluded that the
plaintiff did suffer from an impairment. 74 After overcoming this initial
hurdle, however, the plaintiff's argument failed. 75 Prior to reaching the
merits of the "substantially limits" and the "major life activity" aspects of
166. 912 F. Supp. 580 (D. Me. 1995) (concluding that the plaintiff's HIV infection was a
disability under the ADA). This case ultimately reached the Supreme Court, where the Court
ruled in favor of the HIV-positive plaintiff. See Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624 (1998).
167. 858 F. Supp. 1393 (N.D. Ill. 1994) (alleging pregnancy discrimination).
168. Johnson, 1997 WL 580708, at *6. Rather, the court concluded that those cases
involved plaintiffs who had problems with their reproductive systems. Id. The court also
concluded that even if sex was a major life activity for purposes of the ADA, the plaintiff's
"claimed disinterest" in sex was not a substantial limitation on that major life activity. Id.
169. Id.
170. Branch v. City of New Orleans, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18254 *5. In Branch, some
confusion existed over whether the plaintiff suffered from colitis or Crohn's disease; although
the two illnesses are different, the court seemed to use the two terms interchangeably. Id. at
*1.
171. Id. at *5.
172. Id. at *1. As previously indicated, the court used the terms "colitis" and "Crohn's
disease" interchangeably throughout the opinion.
173. Id. at *2. Specifically, as was discussed earlier in this Article, this three-step process
involves: (1) determining whether the plaintiff suffers from an impairment; (2) determining
whether this impairment limits a major life activity; and (3) determining whether the major life
activity is substantially limited. Id. See Cotter v. Ajilon Servs., Inc., 287 F.3d 593, 597 (6th Cir.
2002) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (2000)). Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 630-31 (1998).
174. Branch, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18254, *2-3.
175. Id. at *3
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the analysis, the court did note that the actualphysical effects of the disease
on the plaintiff, rather than the diagnosis, must be evaluated to make the
disability determination. 176 The court noted:
In making the [disability] determination, the name or diagnosis of
the individual's impairment provides little guidance to the fact
finder. Indeed, some impairments may be disabling for particular
individuals and not for others, depending on the stage of the
disorder or the severity of the affliction. This is especially true
when the adverse effects of an impairment are felt only
sporadically.
77
The court rejected the plaintiff's attempts to use the case of Kling v.
County of Los Angeles 78 to establish the legal proposition that Crohn's
disease should always be considered a disability. 9 The court was also
unwilling to follow case law applying New York's state anti-discrimination
statute because the definition of disability under the state statute lacked the
"substantially limits a major life activity" language.' After analyzing these
cases and the previously discussed statements on ADA disability
determinations, the court in Branch applied those rules and cases to the
facts before it.'8' Unfortunately, the plaintiff's own testimony indicated that
her condition flared up infrequently, and that when it did flare up, she was
often able to perform major life activities.8 2 Therefore, the court rejected
the plaintiff's Rule 50 motion.
18
1
After the jury ruled in favor of the employer, the plaintiff filed a motion
for judgment as a matter of law, or in the alternative, a motion for a new
trial. '8m One of the issues the plaintiff raised was whether the plaintiff's
colitis reached the level of a disability within the meaning of the ADA or
the Rehabilitation Act. 85 The jury had concluded otherwise, and the court
was asked to determine whether that finding was an acceptable
176. Id. at *2-3 (emphasis added).
177. Id. at *2-3.
178. 633 F.2d 876 (9th Cir. 1980), remanded to 769 F.2d 532 (9th Cir. 1985), and rev'd, 474
U.S. 936 (1985).
179. Branch, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18254 at *3, *5.
180. Id. at *4. Specifically, the New York state equivalent did not include the
"substantially limits" and the "major life activities" language in its disability definition, but
rather defined disability as "any physical or mental impairment." N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 296
(McKinney 2001). See Antonsen v. Ward, 571 N.E. 2d 636, 639 (N.Y. 1991).
181. Branch, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18254 at *4-5.
182. Id.
183. Id. at *5.
184. Branch v. City of New Orleans, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6548 (E.D. La. May 9, 1995).
185. Id. at *8.
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interpretation of the facts of the case. 8 6 The court upheld the jury's
conclusion, and therefore denied the plaintiff's post-trial motion.87
In making its determination, the court examined the three-part analysis
used in determining disability status under the ADA the Rehabilitation
Act, and it also evaluated the relevant sections of the Code of Federal
Regulations.'88 Specifically, the court observed that "some impairments may
be disabling for particular individuals but not for others depending on the
stage of the disease, the presence of other impairments that combine to
make the impairment disabling or any number of any other factors."'8 9 The
court concluded that the plaintiff's disease was not an inherently disabling
condition, and the facts of this particular case did not warrant a finding that
the jury's conclusion was unsupported.' Thus, another sufferer of a
"hidden" gastrointestinal illness was denied protection under federal
legislation intended to help individuals with illnesses compete in the
workplace.
The cases discussed in this section of the Article illustrate one of the
many difficulties plaintiffs suffering from either ulcerative colitis or Crohn's
disease face when attempting to establish claims under the ADA or the
Rehabilitation Act.' 9' However, this dilemma is not limited to plaintiffs
suffering from these particular gastrointestinal disorders, but is also
prevalent with many ADA plaintiffs who suffer from all types of illnesses.
192
In fact, not even victims of cancer (including, colon cancer, one of the
leading causes of cancer deaths in this country),' 93 can always establish a
disability under the ADA.'
9 4
186. Id. at *7.
187. Id. at *13-15.
188. Id. at *8-9.
189. Id. at *9 (citing 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app.).
190. Id. at *13. The plaintiff appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit,
but again, did not prevail. 78 F.3d 582 (5th Cir. 1996).
191. In addition to the cases cited in this section of the Article, other cases exist in which
plaintiffs were unable to prove that their illnesses constituted a disabilities under the ADA.
E.g., Douglas v. General Motors Corp., 982 F. Supp. 1448, 1449 (D. Kan. 1997). In Douglas,
the plaintiff was unable to prove a disability when she suffered from a shoulder injury, a neck
injury, and Crohn's disease. Id. at 1449, 1451-52. The court concluded that she could not
prove that these conditions substantially limited her ability to work. Id.
192. See supra note 8.
193. For a breakdown of cancer rates, see Cancer Facts & Figures on the website of the
American Cancer Society at http://www.cancer.org/downloads/ST/CAFF2003PWSecured.pdf
(last visited Nov. 9, 2003).
194. Despite the dreaded nature of this disease, some courts have been reluctant to find
that cancer constitutes a disability under the ADA. See EEOC v. R.J. Gallagher Co., 181 F.3d
645, 653-54 (5th Cir. 1999) (holding that plaintiff's blood cancer was not a substantial
limitation on any major life activities); Gordon v. E.L. Hamm & Associates, Inc., 100 F.3d 907,
909, 915 (11th Cir. 1996) (holding that plaintiff's malignant lymphoma did not constitute a
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However, even if ADA plaintiffs can clear the first litigation hurdle and
prove that they have a disability under the ADA, they are often still left
unprotected by the ADA and/or the Rehabilitation Act. Although these
plaintiffs can prove disability, courts are concluding that these individuals
are unable to perform the essential functions of their positions with a
reasonable accommodation, and are thus not qualified for the positions in
question. 95 This is the second part of the "you're not sick enough"/"you're
too sick" dilemma.
disability under the ADA); Ellison v. Software Spectrum, Inc., 85 F.3d 187,189 (5th Cir. 1996)
(holding that plaintiff's breast cancer did not constitute a disability under the ADA);
Demming v. Housing and Redevelopment Auth., 66 F.3d 950,955 (8th Cir. 1995) (noting that
a plaintiff with thyroid cancer did not establish a disability under the Rehabilitation Act);
Nave v. Wooldridge Constr., 8 A.D. Cases 1351, 1357, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9203 (E.D. Pa.
June 30,1997) (holding that the plaintiff's Hodgkin's disease was not a disability). In Dinsdale
v. Foresman-Addison Wesley, the United States District Court for the Northern District of
Iowa found that the ADA plaintiff was not able to establish she had a disability under the Act,
even after being diagnosed with, and undergoing chemotherapy treatment and surgery for,
colon cancer. 10 A.D. Cases 1400, 1403-04,2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12015 (N.D. Iowa April 13,
2000). The plaintiff was a sales representative for a book company who was diagnosed with
colon cancer in April of 1996. Id. at 1401. After undergoing surgery and chemotherapy, the
plaintiff returned to work in June of 1996, after her employer had merged with another
company. Id. at 1401-02. Before being rehired as an employee of the new, merged company,
the plaintiff interviewed for the position and informed her new employer that she would be
able to work, and that her limitations involved lifting heavy objects and having to pace herself
to cope with her fatigue. Id. at 1402. Despite her belief that she would be able to work as an
effective member of the new company, the plaintiff was unable to meet her sales goals. Id.
Her employer gave her several warnings, placed her on a personal improvement plan, and told
the plaintiff that she was not progressing. Id. Ultimately, her employer fired her and gave her
three months' severance pay. Id. The plaintiff filed suit, alleging violations of the ADA, the
Employment Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461
(2000), and state law. Id. at 1401. The court first addressed the definition of disability under
the ADA. Id. at 1402. After reviewing the relevant statutory definitions and federal
regulations, the court focused on the plaintiff's specific allegation: that she was suffering from
a physical impairment that substantially limited her ability to perform the major life activity of
working. Id. at 1403. Although the court agreed that the cancer constituted an impairment
under the ADA, and that working was a major life activity, the court concluded that the
plaintiff was unable to establish that her cancer substantially limited her ability to work. Id.
The plaintiff was able to work full-time after her leave of absence, and she admitted her ability
to return to work. Id. Because the plaintiff could not establish the substantially limited prong
of her ADA claim, the court did not have to address the other issues involved in the plaintiff's
claim. Id. The court therefore granted the employer's motion for summary judgment. Id.; but
see Robin v. Espo Eng'g Corp., 200 F.3d 1081 (7th Cir. 2000). In Robin, the plaintiff was
diagnosed with colon cancer and was eventually terminated from his sales position. 200 F.3d
at 1086-87. The plaintiff filed suit against his employer alleging discrimination based on
religion, age, and disability. Id. at 1085. Although the plaintiffs disability was not an issue the
Seventh Circuit addressed in detail, it acknowledged that the plaintiff's illness placed him
within the class protected by the ADA. Id. at 1090.
195. E.g., Nesser v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 160 F.3d 442, 445 (8th Cir. 1998).
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B. The "You're Too Sick" Cases
Unlike the many plaintiffs described in the previous cases who were
unable to convince a court that they were substantially limited in any major
life activities, some plaintiffs with colitis or Crohn's disease did overcome
this initial hurdle and established that they had a disability under the ADA
or the Rehabilitation Act.' 96 Unfortunately, these initial victories were
short-lived because the plaintiffs were unable to convince courts that,
despite their disabilities, they were capable of performing the essential
functions of their jobs with reasonable accommodations.'9 Therefore, these
plaintiffs fell into the "you're too sick" category because they did not meet
the definition of being a "qualified individual with a disability."' 98
In Nesser v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 99 the Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals affirmed the lower court's granting of summary judgment in favor
of the employer in an ADA claim brought by a sufferer of Crohn's
disease. 06 The plaintiff began his employment with Trans World Airlines
(TWA) in 1993 and was terminated approximately three years later.' The
plaintiff first worked as a reservation sales agent and later transferred to the
position of rate desk agent. 22 The plaintiff eventually transferred again, this
time to the position of customer service agent, a position he held until his
termination in January 1996.203
The plaintiff suffered from Crohn's disease, and because of the
plaintiff's illness, TWA granted him various medical leaves ranging in. 205
length from five days to over two months. As a result of these absences,• • 206
the plaintiff received numerous written warnings. After his first warning
in 1995, the plaintiff requested to work at home, but TWA denied this
request. 2°7 The plaintiff received two more warnings throughout 1995, with
the last notice warning him of the possibility of discharge.2 8
196. E.g., Nesser, 160 F.3d at 445.
197. Id.
198. See The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990,42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (2000).
199. 160 F.3d 442 (8th Cir. 1998).
200. Id. at 446.
201. Id. at 444.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id. The court described Crohn's disease as "an inflammatory bowel disorder that
produces a thickening of the intestinal wall, a narrowing of the bowel channel, and a variety of
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Due to the plaintiff's excessive absences, TWA held a final hearing in
early 1996 and terminated the plaintiff's employment five days later.2" The
plaintiff filed a charge of discrimination with the EEOC, alleging violations
of the ADA and the equivalent state anti-discrimination statute.10 After
receiving his notice of a right to sue, the plaintiff filed suit in the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri. 21' That court
granted TWA's motion for summary judgment, concluding that the plaintiff
failed to create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether he could
perform the essential functions of his job.2 2
On appeal, the Eighth Circuit quickly determined that the plaintiff could
prove some of the elements of the prima facie case."3 More specifically, and
most important in light of the previous section of this Article, the court
concluded that the plaintiff's Crohn's disease constituted a "disability"
214within the meaning of the ADA. However, because TWA, and most
employers, consider regular work place attendance an "essential function[]"
of employment, and because the plaintiff's condition caused him to miss
numerous workdays throughout his employment, the court concluded that
he was not a qualified individual with a disability, and therefore he was not
protected by the statute.2 5
In determining whether a reasonable accommodation would have allowed
the plaintiff to perform the essential functions of his position, the court
noted that the plaintiff failed to present evidence that a reasonable
accommodation existed.2 6 Specifically, the plaintiff's new position required
211face-to-face contact with customers, thus requiring regular attendance.
The court was careful to note, however, that it was not answering the
question of whether requests to work at home could, in some cases, be
considered "reasonable accommodations" under the ADA.218
In another district court opinion, the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of New York in Mazza v. Bratton was asked to determine
209. Id. TWA made the decision to terminate the plaintiff after the plaintiff asked for
permission to return to his old position as a reservation sales agent and for permission to work
from home. Id. The plaintiff did not, however, present evidence that such a position was
available. Id.
210. Id. at 444-45. See also, Missouri Human Rights Act, Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 213.010-
213.137 (West 1996).




215. Id. at 445-46.
216. Id. at 446.
217. Id.
218. Id. See Section VII B, infra.
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whether a plaintiff who suffered from severe ulcerative colitis was entitled. .. .219
to protection under the ADA and the state anti-discrimination statute. In
Mazza, the court granted the employer's motion for summary judgment
after concluding that the plaintiff, although disabled under the ADA, was
not able to establish a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether he
was able to perform the essential functions of his job, with or without a. • 220
reasonable accommodation. Although the plaintiff suffered from many
symptoms as a result of his severe colitis, his condition improved after using
medication, and he claimed he would have been able to work at the time of
his termination had he been provided with a reasonable accommodation
(being able to use a restroom when needed)."'
The court first addressed whether the plaintiff's condition constituted a
222
disability within the meaning of the ADA. The court briefly went through
the three-step analysis used in making disability determinations and
concluded that there was sufficient evidence that the plaintiff's colitis was a
physical impairment, and that the impairment substantially limited the
plaintiff's major life activities of caring for oneself, working, and controlling
the elimination of waste .2 25 The court therefore concluded that the plaintiff
was a person with a disability under the statute.
22
4
The plaintiff's claim failed, however, when the court proceeded to the
next stage of the ADA analysis.22 The court concluded that the plaintiff
was unable to present a genuine issue of material fact as to whether he was
able to perform the essential functions of his position. Similar to the
227plaintiff in Nesser, who lost his case because he was unable to attend work,
219. Mazza v. Bratton, 108 F. Supp. 2d 167,169-90 (E.D.N.Y. 2000). See also New York
State Human Rights Law, N.Y. EXEC. LAW §§ 290-301 (McKinney 2001).
220. Mazza, 108 F. Supp. 2d at 176-77. The plaintiff in Mazza suffered from a severe case
of colitis. Id. at 169. The extent of his illness was significant: he suffered from diarrhea,
stomach cramps, nausea, gas, bowel urgency, loss of appetite, loss of weight, joint pain,
hemorrhoids, fissures, fatigue, cracks in his rectal area, dehydration, and bloody stool; he also
spent extended periods of time in the hospital. Id. at 169-70.
221. Id. at 170.
222. Id. at 173-74. The defendant argued that the plaintiff's condition did not meet this
requirement, a contention the court quickly dismissed as being "without merit," especially in
light of the defendant's position in front of the EEOC, which was that the plaintiff's
termination was justified because he was too sick to work. Id. at 173.
223. Id. at 173-74. The court concluded that the plaintiff did not create a genuine issue of
material fact with respect to whether he was substantially limited in his ability to care for
himself. Id. at 174-75.
224. Id. In the alternative, the court concluded that the plaintiff, for summary judgment
purposes, met the definition of being disabled because there were fact questions as to whether
the employer regarded him as having a disabiiity. Id. at 175.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Nesser v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 160 F.3d 442,445 (8th Cir. 1998).
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the plaintiff in Mazza was also unable to present evidence as to his
consistent attendance."" Because work attendance is an essential function
of most jobs (including the one involved in this case), the court granted
summary judgment in favor of the defendant.229
Nesser and Mazza are not the only cases in which ADA plaintiffs with
gastrointestinal illnesses proved their disabilities but were unable to prove
their status as qualified individuals with a disability. In Bulos v. Peoplesoft,
Inc.,2 a plaintiff convinced the court that his Crohn's disease constituted a
disability under the ADA and California's state-law equivalent but was
ultimately unsuccessful in his case.231 The plaintiff suffered from Crohn's
disease and a severe type of arthritis and was forced to undergo surgery for
both conditions.- 2 These surgeries caused the plaintiff to miss work.' 3
Although the plaintiff moved up the ranks within the company, his
employer eventually terminated him, allegedly as a result of a reduction in
234force. Believing his employer terminated him because of his illnesses, the
plaintiff sued under the ADA and under state law.235
In spite of convincing the court that he was an individual with a disability,
the plaintiff was unable to convince the court that he was a qualified
individual with a disability. 236 Relying on other federal courts' holdings that
regular work attendance was an essential function of many positions, 27 the
court ultimately concluded that the plaintiff's absences and required leaves
228. Mazza, 180 F. Supp. 2d at 175.
229. Id. at 175-76. The plaintiff's own evidence suggested to the court that despite his
"conclusory statement" that he would have been able to return to work, he would not have
been able to do so. Id. The plaintiff's doctor's notes and other documentary and factual
evidence were clear that the plaintiff had a poor prognosis and that his return to work was not
likely. Id. at 175. The plaintiff's "bald assertion" that he would have been able to work was
not sufficient to overcome the employer's motion for summary judgment. Id. Finally, because
the plaintiff could not create a genuine issue of material fact with respect to whether he
actually asked for an accommodation, the court granted the defendant's summary judgment
motion. Id. at 176.
230. Bulos v. Peoplesoft, Inc., 2000 WL 868532 (N.D. Cal. June 21, 2000).
231. Id. at *1,3.
232. Id. at *1-2.
233. Id.
234. Id. at *2.
235. Id. The state statute under which the plaintiff brought suit was the California Fair
Employment and Housing Act (FEHA). Id. at *3 (referring to CAL. FAIR EMP. & HOUS.
AcT, CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12900 et seq. (West 2004)).
236. Id. at *34.
237. Id. at *3; Nesser v. Trans World Airlines, 165 F.3d 442 (8th Cir. 1998); Duchett v.
Dunlap Tire Corp., 120 F.3d 1222 (11th Cir. 1997).
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of absence caused him to be unqualified for his position."' As a result, the
court granted the employer's motion for summary judgment.29
In yet another case involving a plaintiff suffering from Crohn's disease,
the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York in
Hardy v. The Village of Piermont, N. y. 24 granted summary judgment in
favor of the employer because the plaintiff was unable to perform the
241 Hryessential functions of her position due to her illness. In Hardy, the
plaintiff, a police officer, alleged that her employer violated the
Rehabilitation Act when it terminated her because she could not walk long
242distances or run. The court found "no dispute" that walking long
distances and running were duties of a police officer and that the plaintiff,
by her own admission, was unable to perform those tasks.2 43 The court
reiterated that although an employer must make a reasonable
accommodation for an employee with a disability, employers are not
244
required to eliminate any essential job functions. Because the plaintiff
was unable to perform certain essential job functions, the court granted the
employer's motion for summary judgment.4
As this section of the Article illustrates, many colitis and Crohn's disease
sufferers have difficulty proving that they are qualified to perform the
essential functions of their jobs due to their disabilities. Although these
plaintiffs can convince courts of their disabilities, that victory is insignificant
in light of the ultimate outcome of their cases. As the next section of this
Article will demonstrate, at least one plaintiff lost his ADA claim as a result
of the court's combining of these two hurdles ADA plaintiffs face.
238. Bulos, 2000 WL 868532, at *4.
239. Id. at *3-4, 6.
240. 923 F. Supp. 604 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
241. Id. at 605, 611.
242. Id. at 605-06.
243. Id. at 610. The court rejected the plaintiff's argument that the police department
could have created a light duty position for her, and the court also rejected her argument that
this determination was factual in nature and therefore not appropriate for summary judgment.
Id. This outcome appears somewhat at odds with the previously discussed case of Stone v.
City of Mount Vernon, 118 F.3d 92, 101 (2d Cir. 1997), where the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit concluded that genuine issues of material fact remained with
respect to whether a paralyzed firefighter could have been assigned to a position that did not
require "fire-suppression" as an essential function. Although certainly distinguishable, these
cases provide one example of where an individual with an obvious disability was treated more
favorably by the courts than an individual with a "hidden" impairment.
244. Hardy, 923 F. Supp. at 610-11.
245. Id. at 611.
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C. The "You're Not Sick Enough, But If You Are Sick Enough, You're
Too Sick" Dilemma
In addition to the two problems described above, one plaintiff found
himself in another, extremely difficult situation. Specifically, the court in
Pangalos v. Prudential Insurance CO.2 46 ruled against the plaintiff either
because he did not have a disability within the meaning of the ADA or
because even if he did have a disability, he was not a qualified individual
with a disability.247 In Pangalos, the plaintiff suffered severe attacks of
uncontrollable diarrhea, hemorrhoids, and bloody stools as a result of his•.• 248
severe ulcerative colitis, and surgically removing the plaintiff's colon was
the only permanent solution.249 The plaintiff rejected this surgical option,
believing that it was too "drastic."' 0 The plaintiff then alleged that his
employer failed to make a reasonable accommodation for his condition and
therefore violated the ADA.2-'
The court addressed the plaintiff's symptoms and the accommodations he
requested (such as a specially equipped vehicle or a transfer to a position
that did not require travel)2 2 and then addressed the issue of whether the
253plaintiff suffered from a disability under the ADA. The court
acknowledged that the plaintiff could have had surgery to alleviate his
impairment, and the court also found it important that the plaintiff did not
"seriously consider[]" a diaper or other device that would have helped
alleviate his problem. The court ultimately determined that either the
plaintiff was not disabled "because the disabling condition he allege[d]
could readily be remedied surgically,"' 5 or that the plaintiff was not a
qualified individual with a disability because he could not perform the
246. No. 96-0167, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15749 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 15, 1996), affd, 118 F.3d
1577 (3d Cir. 1997), motion granted, 522 U.S. 1008 (1997).
247. Id. at *8. The following case description of Pangalos is taken from a previous article
by the author. Rosenthal, supra note 70.
248. Pangalos, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15749, at *1.
249. Rosenthal, supra note 70, at 453 (citing Pangalos, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15749, at
*3).
250. Id. (citing Pangalos, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15749, at *3).
251. Id. (citing Pangalos, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15749, at *2).
252. Id. (citing Pangalos, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15749, at *4-5). In addition, the court
addressed the accommodations the employer offered to the plaintiff, such as providing a
portable toilet or allowing him to interview for other positions within the company. Id. at 453
n.221 (citing Pangalos, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15749, at *4-5).
253. Id. (citing Pangalos, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15749, at *4-5).
254. Id. (citing Pangalos, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15749, at *7). The plaintiff preferred not
to use a diaper because of its discomfort and because he would have been required to sit in his
own excrement, which would have produced rashes. Id. at 453 n.224 (citing Pangalos, 1996
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15749, at *6).
255. Id. at 453 (citing Pangalos, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15749, at *8).
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essential functions of his job.2 56 The court noted that only the plaintiff could
decide whether to undergo the surgery; 57 of course, the court implied that
the plaintiff would most likely lose protection of the Act if he chose against
the surgical option.258
Therefore the Pangalos decision highlights the catch-22 in which plaintiffs
with colitis, Crohn's disease, and many other illnesses find themselves.
Even if these plaintiffs can establish a disability under the ADA, they lose
their cases. Such a result occurs because they are unable to demonstrate
that they can perform the essential functions of their positions and are thus
not qualified individuals with a disability.2 9 Although most ADA plaintiffs
lose their cases because of these two issues, the next section of the Article
will demonstrate that there are still other reasons why these ADA plaintiffs
fail.
IV. OTHER CASES THAT FAILED
In addition to losing ADA and Rehabilitation Act cases because of an
inability to prove a disability or to prove being a qualified individual with a
disability, some plaintiffs with these diseases are losing on other grounds.
For example, in Bettis v. Department of Human Services of the State of
Illinois,26° a plaintiff who suffered from Crohn's disease lost his ADA claim
because he was unable to show that the accommodation he requested was a
"reasonable accommodation. 261  The plaintiff, who underwent a total
256. Id. (citing Pangalos, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15749, at *8).
257. Id. (citing Pangalos, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15749, at *7).
258. Id. (citing Pangalos, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15749, at *7-8). See also Caporilli v. City
of Rome, N.Y., No. 85-CV-1320, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22687 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 13, 1992). In
Caporilli, the United States District Court for the Northern District of New York determined
that an individual who underwent surgery to remove his colon was not an individual with a
disability under the Rehabilitation Act or the equivalent state anti-discrimination statute.
Rosenthal, supra note 70, at 453. (citing Pangalos, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15749, at * 13). The
court reached this conclusion based on the fact that his surgery corrected his condition and did
not significantly restrict his ability to perform any major life activities. Id. (citing Pangalos,
1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15749, at *10-14). Additionally, the plaintiff admitted on his medical
history exam form that he had been cured of his condition. Id. (citing Pangalos, 1996 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 15749, at *4-5).
259. See supra Part III.B.
260. 70 F. Supp. 2d 865 (C.D. Ill. 1999).
261. Id. at 865, 868. The court described the plaintiff's illness as "a condition that affects
the digestive tract causing diarrhea, which in turn, makes [the plaintiff] prone to dehydration,
fatigue, muscle cramps, fever, joint pain, and episodic hypokalemic paralysis." Id. at 865.
Admittedly, this case and some of the other cases in this section of the Article could be
considered under the category of cases involving plaintiffs not being qualified individuals with
disabilities; however, because the issues in these cases were slightly different than the issues in
that section of the Article, I placed them in a separate section.
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removal of his colon as a result of his condition,262 was a maintenance
worker, and one of his responsibilities included performing maintenance
work on laundry equipment. 26' Because the hot temperatures in his work
environment aggravated his condition, he requested three accommodations,
all of which his employer denied.26 Some time later, the plaintiff applied
for a transfer to another position as a reasonable accommodation, even
though this position paid almost twenty thousand dollars more per year.
2 65
The employer rejected the plaintiff for this new position, and the plaintiff
266then filed suit under the ADA.
The court first acknowledged that the ADA does require employers to
make reasonable accommodations for employees with disabilities. It then
acknowledged that such accommodations can include reassignment to a•.• 268
vacant position. Although this initial discussion appeared promising for
the plaintiff, the court limited its opinion to the facts alleged by the plaintiff:
that the defendant violated the ADA when it decided not to promote the•- 269
plaintiff to the new position. The court indicated that it was not
addressing the issue of whether the employer had any obligation to consider
any other reasonable accommodations, as the plaintiff did not allege an
ADA violation on any basis other than the refusal to transfer to a higher-payin • • 270
paying position. The employer argued, and the court ultimately agreed,
that although it was required to make a reasonable accommodation for the
plaintiff, the ADA did not require the employer to promote the plaintiff.
27'
262. Id. at 865-66.
263. Id. at 865.
264. Id. at 866. These accommodations included air conditioning, breaks, and time to cool
down. Id.
265. Id.
266. Id. After discovery, the employer moved for summary judgment, arguing that
because such a job transfer would have been a promotion, the ADA did not require the
employer to provide this as a reasonable accommodation. Id. at 866-67.
267. Id.
268. Id. at 867. According to the C.F.R., examples of reasonable accommodations include
job restructuring, part-time or modified work schedules, and reassignment to a vacant
position. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(2) (2002).
269. Bettis, 70 F. Supp. 2d at 867.
270. Id.
271. Id. at 867-68. The employer argued that because the position to which the plaintiff
wished to be transferred paid almost twenty thousand dollars more per year, that transfer
constituted a promotion and therefore was not required under the ADA because it would
have caused an undue hardship. Id. at 867. Although employers are required to make
reasonable accommodations for employees with disabilities, employers are not required to do
so if such an accommodation would pose an "undue hardship" on the employer. 42 U.S.C. §
12112(b)(5)(A) (2000). Whether an accommodation would cause an undue hardship is based
on a variety of factors, such as the cost of the accommodation, the size and resources of the
employer, and the impact of the accommodation on the employer's operations. 29 C.F.R. §
1630.2(p)(2) (2002).
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The plaintiff agreed that the transfer would have constituted a promotion,
but made the "beside the point and confusing" argument that because the
employer's own policies did not prohibit such a transfer as a reasonable
accommodation, the ADA's "no promotion" rule did not apply to this
272case.
The court rejected the plaintiff's argument and concluded that the
273promotion did not constitute a reasonable accommodation. The court
first observed that the ADA does not require an employer to provide the
accommodation the employee requests; it only requires an employer to
274provide a reasonable accommodation. Second, the court reasoned that
simply because the employer had a policy of allowing promotions, this did
not demonstrate that the promotion the plaintiff requested was a
"reasonable accommodation., 271 In connection with this statement, the
court observed that the ADA does not require employers to promote
employees. 76 The court then noted that the ADA was not intended to be
an "affirmative action" piece of legislation used to benefit employees with
disabilities;27 7 rather, the ADA was only intended to "level the playing field"
for individuals who suffered past discrimination based on their disabilities.278
Therefore, the court determined that the employer did not violate the ADA
when it denied the promotion to the ADA plaintiff.279 This is just one more
case where an employee who was able to overcome the initial hurdle of
establishing a disability under the ADA was ultimately unsuccessful
because he could not prevail at a later stage of the ADA analysis. 20
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit also addressed
the reasonable accommodation aspect of an ADA claim brought by a
272. Bettis, 70 F. Supp. 2d at 867.







280. Id. at 865-68. See also Wilder v. Southeastern Pub. Serv. Auth., 869 F. Supp. 409
(E.D. Va. 1994), affd, 69 F.3d 534 (4th Cir. 1995). In Wilder, the court found the plaintiff's
Crohn's disease was indeed a disability under the Act, but held that the plaintiff was unable to
prove discrimination on the basis of his disability. Id. at 417-418. Additionally, the court went
on to observe that even if the plaintiff was able to demonstrate disability-based discrimination,
his claim still would have failed because he was not a qualified individual with a disability. Id.
at 418. The court reached this conclusion because the plaintiff was absent for more than four
months in a thirty-six month period. Id. Relying on the Fourth Circuit's opinion in Tyndall v.
Nat'l Educ. Ctrs., Inc., 31 F.3d 209 (4th Cir. 1994), which held that regular and reliable
attendance was a necessary requirement for most jobs, the court concluded that the plaintiff
was unable to perform that function and was therefore not a qualified employee. Wilder, 869
F. Supp. at 418.
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plaintiff suffering from Crohn's disease when it decided Patterson v. City of
Seattle.18' In Patterson, the Ninth Circuit was asked to determine whether a
plaintiff's request that he be moved away from a former supervisor who had
previously harassed him was a request for a "reasonable accommodation"
under the ADA and its state law equivalent.28 2 The lower court had granted
the employer's motion for summary judgment on this issue, and the plaintiff
appealed.2 3
In Patterson, after prevailing in a retaliation claim in a previous lawsuit
alleging harassment and retaliation at the workplace, the plaintiff lost his
job and was later re-hired by the Seattle Water Department. 2 84 Eventually,
the supervisor whom the plaintiff alleged had previously harassed him was
transferred to the same building as the plaintiff.2 85 As a result of this
transfer, the plaintiff informed his supervisor that he was ill and was
suffering from Crohn's disease. 2 ' The plaintiff then left his position and
never returned8 7
Prior to attempting to return to his job, the plaintiff had made a request
for three accommodations under the ADA.2 m Specifically, the plaintiff
asked his employer: (1) if it could provide him with an adequate workplace;
(2) if it could provide him with adequate equipment for him to perform his
job; and, most importantly, (3) if it could remove his former supervisor from
the building in which they both would have worked had the plaintiff
returned to work.289 The plaintiff also suggested other alternatives that
would have allowed him and his former boss to avoid each other.20
Although the city granted the first two of the plaintiff's requests, it did not
agree to provide the accommodation regarding the plaintiff's former
supervisor's presence in the same building.29' Because the city failed to
grant the plaintiff's final request, the plaintiff did not return to work and
eventually sued, alleging that the failure to separate the two employees
constituted a failure to reasonably accommodate the plaintiff's Crohn's
292
disease.
281. No. 95-35487, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 24667 (9th Cir. Sept. 17, 1996).
282. Id. at *4-6.
283. Id. at *2.
284. Id. at *3.
285. Id. at *4.
286. Id.
287. Id.
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The plaintiff's lawsuit alleged violations of the ADA and Washington's
anti-discrimination statute.293 The Ninth Circuit concluded that the plaintiff
was unable to make the requisite facial showing that an accommodation was
required to permit him to perform the essential functions of his position;
294
therefore, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the lower court's granting of summary
291
judgment in the employer's favor.
As the above-described cases demonstrate, plaintiffs suffering from
gastrointestinal disorders such as colitis and Crohn's disease have not been
successful when bringing ADA claims. 296 The catch-22 of being "not sick
enough" or "too sick" proves quite troublesome, and presents a typical
difficulty for many ADA plaintiffs.29' Additionally, ADA plaintiffs with
gastrointestinal illnesses have lost their cases on other grounds as well.298
However, despite these hurdles, some plaintiffs have achieved some success,
although many times the success has been short-lived.299
V. SHORT-LIVED VICTORIES
One of the first cases where a plaintiff won an initial victory but
ultimately lost her case was Kling v. County of Los Angeles... In Kling, the
Ninth Circuit ruled in favor of the plaintiff on two separate occasions, but
the United States Supreme Court reversed.30  Curiously, the Supreme
Court provided no explanation for its decision, but the ultimate outcome
was a denial of relief under the ADA to a plaintiff suffering from a
gastrointestinal disease. 3°
293. Id. at *2. The state statute at issue was the Washington Law Against Discrimination.
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 49.60 (West 2002).
294. Patterson, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 24667, at *8. Specifically, although the plaintiff was
able to present evidence that stress aggravated Crohn's disease, and that his being
"continuously exposed" to his former supervisor would exacerbate his condition, the court
determined that there was no evidence that the plaintiff would be "continuously exposed" to
his former supervisor even if they did work in the same building. Id. at *8-9. The court noted
that the two individuals did not work in the same department or on the same floor, and that
the two were no longer in any type of supervisor/subordinate relationship. Id. The court
determined that the "mere possibility" of running into his former supervisor was not enough
to require the employer to provide the requested accommodation. Id. at *9.
295. Id. at *2.
296. See supra Part Ill.
297. See supra Part III.
298. See supra Part IV.
299. See infra Part V.
300. 769 F.2d 532 (9th Cir. 1985), rev'd, 474 U.S. 936 (1985).
301. See 633 F.2d 876 (9th Cir. 1980); 769 F.2d 532 (9th Cir. 1985); 474 U.S. 936 (1985).
302. See Kling, 474 U.S. 936 (reversing County of Los Angeles v. Kling, 769 F.2d 532 (9th
Cir. 1985)).
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In Kling, the plaintiff suffered from Crohn's disease and sued various
defendants when she was denied admission to a school's nursing program.
The plaintiff alleged this rejection was because of her Crohn's disease and
brought an action under the Rehabilitation Act (the ADA had not yet been
passed).'0 The district court initially denied the plaintiff's request for an
order requiring the school to admit her to its nursing program, a decision
appealed to the Ninth Circuit. 5 The Ninth Circuit reversed and concluded
that because the plaintiff had a likelihood of success on the merits of her
claim, an order requiring the school to admit the plaintiff was appropriate.
The school's position was not that the plaintiff was unable to meet the
school's requirements; rather, the school argued that the plaintiff's illness
would require her to miss a large number of classes. 3 7 The plaintiff's doctor
testified that she could attend the classes, and that the plaintiff could
minimize any conflicts with her schooling, even in the event of
hospitalization.0 8 The Ninth Circuit concluded that the testimony
sufficiently showed a probability of success on the merits, and justified an
injunction forcing the school to admit the plaintiff."1
The plaintiff was also successful on her second appeal to the Ninth
Circuit' 0 After the Ninth Circuit's initial decision, the trial court found that
the plaintiff was not a handicapped person under the Rehabilitation Act,
she was not discriminated against in violation of the Rehabilitation Act, and
that the plaintiff did not suffer any compensable harm as a result of her
rejection.3" The Ninth Circuit, noting that the evidence at the trial was not
substantially different than the evidence it considered when it originally
303. Kling, 633 F.2d at 877. The plaintiff in Kling was originally accepted into the
defendant's nursing program and attended orientation. Id. The plaintiff eventually underwent
a physical examination and was told that she could not enroll in the program. Id.
304. Id. at 877. The plaintiff sued the school, seeking injunctive and declaratory relief, but
the district court ruled that because she had failed to exhaust her administrative remedies, her
claim failed. Id. at 877-78.
305. Id.
306. Id. at 879-80. First, the Ninth Circuit quickly concluded that the plaintiff's Crohn's
disease was a handicap under the Rehabilitation Act. Id. at 878. Second, the court concluded
that the Rehabilitation Act did provide for a private cause of action. Id. Third, the court
determined that although the plaintiff did not exhaust her administrative remedies, she was
not required to do so because that would not have afforded the plaintiff adequate relief. Id. at
879. Finally, after the Ninth Circuit addressed these preliminary matters, it addressed the
merits of the plaintiff's Rehabilitation Act claim. Id. at 879-80.
307. Id. at 879.
308. Id.
309. Id. at 879-80. After the Ninth Circuit ordered it to do so, the school agreed to admit
the plaintiff, but the school was not willing to accept the transfer credits the plaintiff had
earned at another school during the initial litigation. Kling, 769 F.2d 532,533 (9th Cir. 1985).
310. Kling, 769 F.2d 532, 533 (9th Cir. 1985).
311. Id.
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ruled in the plaintiff's favor, again ruled in favor of the plaintiff.12
Specifically, the Ninth Circuit found the district court's holding was clearly
erroneous, that the plaintiff was indeed an otherwise qualified handicapped
individual, and that the school rejected her solely because of her illness. 13
The Ninth Circuit therefore reversed the district court again.t 4
Although the plaintiff was once again victorious at the Court of Appeals,
the United States Supreme Court reversed without a written opinion.315 The
end result was the same: another sufferer of a gastrointestinal illness was
denied relief under a federal statute aimed at prohibiting disability-based
316discrimination.
The plaintiff in Kling was not the only plaintiff to suffer such a fate. In
Davis v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. 317 the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania first denied the employer's motion for
summary judgment on an ADA claim, but then, after the plaintiff won at
trial, granted the employer's motion for judgment as a matter of law.318 In
Davis, the plaintiff suffered from Crohn's disease and had requested
accommodations from her employer, which would have allowed the plaintiff
to spend less time in the office and more time at home. 319 After a meeting,
the parties agreed to modify the plaintiff's work schedule to allow her to
work at home some days of the week.3 20 Additionally, the employer agreed
to provide the plaintiff with computer access while working at home. 2'
Despite this schedule, there was evidence that the plaintiff missed
numerous workdays.322
312. Id. at 533-34.
313. Id. at 533. The Ninth Circuit concluded:
The school's physician... rejected Kling because she suffers from Crohn's Disease.
He assumed that merely because of her disease she would be unable to complete the
school's program. He did not evaluate her on an individual basis and even testified
that had he known more about Kling's medical history, he would have been "swayed
very strongly toward acceptance." It is precisely this type of general assumption
about a handicapped person's ability that section 504 was designed to avoid.
Id. at 533-34.
314. Id. at 534.
315. County of Los Angeles v. Kling, 474 U.S. 936 (1985). In his dissenting opinion,
Justice Stevens criticized the Court for reversing the Ninth Circuit without providing an
explanation for doing so. Id. at 937-40 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
316. See id.
317. No. 98-5209, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 719 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 1, 2000).
318. Davis v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., No. 98-5209,2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18166 (E.D. Pa.
Dec. 15, 2000).
319. Id. at *2-3.
320. Id. at *3.
321. Id.
322. Id. Whether the plaintiff was absent from work because of her Crohn's disease or
due to maternity leave was disputed. Id.
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After the plaintiff's manager realized that the schedule was not effective,
he asked the plaintiff to commit to a definite schedule, which required her
presence in the office on two particular days per week. - Because of the
unpredictable nature of the plaintiff's illness, the plaintiff was reluctant to
agree to such a schedule, and asked that she be allowed to work exclusively
from home on the days when her Crohn's disease was acting up. 24 The
employer denied this request and the plaintiff went on disability leave.2 As
a result, the plaintiff filed her complaint, alleging violations of both the
ADA and the Pennsylvania state law equivalent.
26
After setting out the proper analytical framework for analyzing an ADA
dispute, the court acknowledged that the plaintiff's Crohn's disease was
indeed a disability. 7 In its motion, the defendant argued that the plaintiff
was unable to demonstrate that she was a qualified individual with a
disability because she could not perform the essential functions of her job
commuting to the office two days per week . 2 The employer also argued
that the ADA did not require it to allow the plaintiff to stay at home
129continuously throughout the periods in which the disease flared up.
The court acknowledged that an employer has discretion in determining a
position's essential functions, and that this determination deserves some
weight.330 Additionally, although both parties agreed that allowing the
plaintiff to work at home two days per week was a reasonable
accommodation, the plaintiff contended that the employer's attempt to
develop a specific schedule was the employer's way of forcing her out of her
position."' The employer contended that the nature of the plaintiff's
position required her attendance at the office at least two scheduled days
per week, and that her absence would render her unable to perform this
332
essential function.
At the summary judgment stage, the court rejected the employer's
contention and concluded there was at least a triable question of fact on
that issue. 3 Specifically, the court looked at the fact that the defendant did
323. Id.
324. Id.
325. Id. at *4-5.
326. Id. at *1-2. The state statute under which the plaintiff brought suit was the
Pennsylvania Human Relations Act (PHRA). Id. at *1 (referring to PA. HUMAN RELATIONS
ACT, 1 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 951 et seq. (West 2004)).
327. Id. at *8-10.
328. Id. at *10-11.
329. Id. at *11.
330. Id. at *11-12.
331. Id. at *12.
332. Id. at *12-13.
333. Id. at *14-15.
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not have any specific days during which training sessions took place
(thereby not requiring mandatory attendance on those days), and the
plaintiff had been able to schedule according to her illness in the past.A
The court ultimately determined that a jury could conclude that the
employer's set schedule requirement was unnecessary.335
Despite this initial victory, the plaintiff's success was short-lived. After
the plaintiff prevailed at trial, the court granted the employer's post-trial
motion for judgment as a matter of law because the plaintiff failed to
engage in the required "interactive process" to decide upon a reasonable
accommodation."' Because the plaintiff simply rejected her employer's
most recent accommodation proposal, the employer was not liable for an
ADA violation.
Thus, as this section of the Article has demonstrated, colitis and Crohn's
disease plaintiffs under the ADA lose their cases on various grounds other
than their inability to prove a disability and their inability to prove being a
qualified individual. Even when some of these plaintiffs have experienced
some mild success, those victories have been short-lived.3 3 9 This is certainly
not unique to individuals with these gastrointestinal disorders; rather, it is




335. Id. The court concluded that the conflicting evidence required a denial of the motion
for summary judgment. Id. at *15. The court also concluded that fact questions remained
regarding the plaintiff's request that she be allowed to stay at home during periods when her
Crohn's disease flared up, and it therefore determined that summary judgment was
inappropriate. Id. at *19.
336. See id. at *24.
337. Id. at *17-18 (relying on 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(3)).
338. Id. at *20.
339. In addition to the cases discussed in this section of the Article, other cases
demonstrate the legal failures of plaintiffs with gastrointestinal disorders. E.g., Finnicum v.
Evant, Inc., No. 98-3347, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 9849 (6th Cir. 1999) (Unpublished) (affirming
summary judgment in favor of the employer because the plaintiff, who suffered from a
"gastrointestinal problem" and psychological problems, did not satisfy the definition of
disability); Adams v. City of Los Angeles, No. 96-55938, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 15457 (9th
Cir. 1997) (Unpublished) (affirming summary judgment in favor of the employer because the
plaintiff's perianal fistulae did not constitute a disability under the Act); Montandon v.
Farmland Indus., Inc., 116 F.3d 355 (8th Cir. 1997) (holding that the ADA plaintiff's stomach
problems and loss of appetite were not disabilities under the Act); Powell v. Fluor Daniel, Inc.,
No. 95-3212, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 835 (4th Cir. 1997) (Unpublished) (affirming jury verdict
against the ADA plaintiff who suffered from a "severe gastrointestinal disorder"); Miranda v.
Wisc. Power & Light Co., 91 F.3d 1011, 1013, 1018 (7th Cir. 1996) (rejecting the plaintiff's
ADA constructive discharge/hostile environment claim based on the plaintiff's diverticulosis,
which the court described as an "intestinal disorder characterized by the presence of small,
pouch-like sacs (diverticula) protruding from the intestine").
340. See Colker, A Windfall for Defendants, supra note 8; Colker, Winning and Losing
under the ADA, supra note 8.
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VI. SOME MILD SUCCESSES
Although most people suffering from colitis or Crohn's disease have
failed in their ADA or Rehabilitation Act claims, a few plaintiffs have
experienced some success. Most of this success has come either at the
very preliminary stages of litigation or has been of a very limited nature.
For example, after appealing the lower court's granting of the employer's
motion to dismiss, the plaintiff in Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission v. Browning-Ferris, Inc.143 convinced the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit to reverse the lower court's judgment and
remand the case for further proceedings.3 4
In Browning-Ferris, the issue before the Fourth Circuit was whether the
plaintiff's allegations sufficiently established that she had a disability under
the ADA. 4 4The plaintiff,346 who suffered from Crohn's disease, alleged that
her former employer perceived her as having a disability under the ADA.47
The district court granted the employer's motion to dismiss, concluding that
the plaintiff failed to allege that she was substantially limited in her ability
to perform a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs, a prerequisite for
prevailing in a claim that a plaintiff was substantially limited in the major
life activity of working.
Focusing on two issues, the Fourth Circuit reversed.349 First, the court
examined whether the district court read the plaintiff's complaint too
narrowly, and second, the court examined whether "working around waste"
satisfied the major life activity of working."" The Fourth Circuit concluded
that the district court read the plaintiff's complaint too narrowly and that
the plaintiff should have been given the opportunity to prove that her
employer regarded her as being substantially limited in a major life activity
341. As discussed earlier in this Article, not every ADA plaintiff with one of these
ailments deserves to win his ADA claim. However, this Article highlights the problems so
many ADA plaintiffs with gastrointestinal and other "hidden" illnesses face when attempting
to pursue a claim under the ADA.
342. One other example of a published opinion in which a plaintiff with Crohn's disease
experienced a slight victory was Jones v. Hodel, 711 F. Supp. 1048 (D. Utah 1989). The court
denied the employer's motion for summary judgment, concluding that although the doctrine of
equitable tolling did not save the plaintiff's Rehabilitation Act claim, there was a genuine issue
of material fact about whether the employer waived that defense. Id. at 1054.
343. No. 99-2413, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 18273 (4th Cir. 2000).
344. Id. at*ll.
345. Id. at *5.
346. Id. at *1-2. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission filed on behalf of the
employee, thereby proceeding as the actual plaintiff. Id.
347. Id. at *2-3.
348. Id. at *3-4.
349. Id. at *11.
350. Id. at *7-10.
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other than working.31 The court also found that the plaintiff met the notice
pleading requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure when she
alleged that the employer "placed [the plaintiff] on unpaid leave and shortly
thereafter terminated her based upon [the employer's] perception that she
was disabled. '
The Fourth Circuit then addressed whether the plaintiff's allegations
regarding the plaintiff's ability to work around waste sufficiently alleged an
inability to perform the major life activity of working.353 The court noted
that to satisfy the requirement of a substantial limitation in the major life
activity of working, an ADA plaintiff must demonstrate an inability to
perform a class or a wide range of jobs;354 it was not sufficient to allege that
she could not perform one type of specialized job.355  Although
acknowledging that this was a close case, the court concluded that
"'working around waste' could conceivably cover a broad range of jobs,
including a host of positions wholly separate from the waste removal
industry., 356  Therefore, the Fourth Circuit reversed the lower court's
granting of the employer's motion to dismiss and remanded the case to
allow the plaintiff to present evidence that the employer regarded the
plaintiff as being substantially limited in her ability to work.357 This presents
one example of a plaintiff suffering from a gastrointestinal disorder who
defeated an employer's motion to dismiss. 58 Although this case was
certainly not a victory on the merits, this plaintiff was at least able to keep
her claim alive.359
Because these preliminary victories are not ultimate victories on the
merits, plaintiffs with these disorders must still determine how to pursue
351. Id. at *7-8.
352. Id. at *8.
353. Id. at *6-11.
354. Id. at *7-10.
355. Id. at *9-10.
356. Id. at *10.
357. Id. at *11.
358. For another example of where a plaintff with a gastrointestinal disease experienced
some success, see Workman v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 165 F.3d 460 (6th Cir. 1999). In Workman, the
appellate court did not disturb the jury's finding that the plaintiff's condition of spastic colon
(a condition typically less severe than colitis or Crohn's disease) constituted a disability under
the ADA. ld. at 463, 469.
359. For other examples of cases where the plaintiffs were able to win preliminary
victories, see Seery v. Biogen, Inc., 203 F. Supp. 2d 35, 47 (D. Mass. 2002) (holding that the
plaintiff's claim was not time-barred); Westinghouse Elec. Supply Corp. v. Mass. Comm'n
Against Discrimination, No. 97-4267E, 1999 Mass. Super. LEXIS 65, at *25-26 (March 5,1999)
(holding under state law that the plaintiff, who suffered from Crohn's disease, had a
disability); Winokur v. Office of Ct. Admin., 190 F. Supp. 2d 444,448-49,452 (E.D.N.Y. 2002)
(holding that part of the plaintiff's claim survived a motion to dismiss because the plaintiff did
allege a substantial limitation on a major life activity).
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other avenues that will provide them with a greater possibility of obtaining
relief. Although the ADA was meant to benefit people with disabilities,
plaintiffs with these gastrointestinal illnesses (and other illnesses) might
have to look elsewhere to obtain relief for the adverse employment actions
they suffer as a result of their conditions. In the alternative, they will have
to convince courts to adopt a more liberal interpretation of the ADA-a
possibility unlikely to occur in the near future.
VII. POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS TO THE PROBLEM
Because plaintiffs with these conditions are losing their cases
predominantly at two stages-the disability stage and the qualified
individual with a disability stage-plaintiffs must develop a way to
overcome these two hurdles. They must first determine how to convince
the courts that they have a "disability" under the ADA (or Rehabilitation
Act), and then they must determine how to convince the courts that despite
these disabilities, they are indeed able to perform the essential functions of
their positions. Because the Supreme Court and Congress are unlikely to
broaden the ADA's scope, the outlook appears quite bleak for these
plaintiffs.36° However, some avenues exist that these plaintiffs might pursue
to obtain some legal remedy for the adverse employment actions they
experience as a result of their illnesses.
A. Attempt to Assert State Law Claims and Other Federal Law Claims
The Americans with Disabilities Act is the federal law that attempts to
create equal opportunities for employees with disabilities. However, in
addition to the ADA (and the Rehabilitation Act), state laws also serve that
same purpose. Although many of the plaintiffs discussed in this Article
brought parallel state law claims and also failed under those claims, some
state anti-discrimination laws apply more liberally than the federal anti-
discrimination statutes.361 Although this is the exception rather than the
360. Although Congress is unlikely to act on this specific issue, Congress has, in the past,
acted in response to Supreme Court decisions in the employment discrimination context.
Specifically, in passing the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Congress was responding to the Supreme
Court's decisions in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 258 (1989) and Wards Cove
Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642,655 (1989). Davey v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 301 F.3d
1204, 1213 (10th Cir. 2002) (acknowledging that the Civil Rights Act of 1991 overruled Price
Waterhouse); Zubi v. AT&T Corp., 219 F.3d 220,224 (3d Cir. 2000) (same); Allen v. Entergy
Corp., 193 F.3d 1010, 1015 (8th Cir. 1999) (noting that the Civil Rights Act of 1991 expressly
amended Title VII to overrule Wards Cove); Fitzpatrick v. City of Atlanta, 2 F.3d 1112,1117
(11th Cir. 1993) (same).
361. For example, as will be discussed later in this Article, the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts has interpreted that state's anti-discrimination statute, Massachusetts General
Laws ch. 151B, more broadly than how the federal courts are now required to interpret the
ADA. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 151B, § 1 et seq. (West 2004).
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rule, ADA plaintiffs should certainly investigate this possibility by
analyzing state anti-discrimination laws.
One such area where state law might respond favorably to disability
discrimination plaintiffs is in the determination of what constitutes a
disability. The Supreme Court has dramatically narrowed this definition
since the effective date of the employment provisions of the ADA; 62
however, some state courts have been more generous when interpreting the
definition of disability under the state law equivalent of the ADA. One of
the states to adopt a more plaintiff-friendly definition of the term
"disability" is Massachusetts. 6 3 Three years after Sutton, the Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts decided to reject the United States
Supreme Court's narrow interpretation of the definition of disability when
resolving a case under the Massachusetts law prohibiting discrimination
against individuals with disabilities.36 Specifically, in Dahill v. Police
365Department of Boston, the court decided against considering mitigating
measures when determining whether an individual suffers from a disability,
despite the fact that the relevant definitions of the Massachusetts anti-
discrimination statute nearly mirrored the ADA's definitions.3 6
In Dahill, the court looked at whether a hearing-impaired police officer
had a handicap within the meaning of Massachusetts's anti-discrimination
statute. 36' The plaintiff filed suit under both state and federal law when the
police department terminated his employment after concluding that the
plaintiff's hearing impairment rendered him "incapable of effectively and
safely performing the essential duties of a Police Officer." 36" One of the
issues the Supreme Judicial Court addressed was whether the plaintiff
suffered from a handicap within the meaning of the Massachusetts anti-
discrimination statute. 369 Because the Massachusetts statute was not clear
362. See supra note 67.
363. See Dahill v. Police Dep't of Boston, 748 N.E.2d 956 (Mass. 2001). The state statute
at issue in Dahill used the term "handicap" instead of "disability." See id. at 957. For
purposes of this section of the Article, those terms are interchangeable.
364. Id. at 964. The state statute involved in that case was Massachusetts General Laws,
chapter 151B section 1.
365. 748 N.E.2d 956 (Mass. 2001).
366. Id. at 964.
367. Id. at 958-59.
368. Id. Although he was born with a very severe hearing impairment, with the use of
hearing aids, the plaintiff's hearing fell "within normal limits." Id. at 958. In fact, the plaintiff
had been quite successful despite his hearing impairment, graduating from both college and
law school. Id.
369. Id. at 959. The police department argued that the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts should adopt the U.S. Supreme Court's interpretation of "disability" from
Sutton (and therefore consider mitigating measures when making the initial disability
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on its face, the Supreme Judicial Court looked at other sources to determine
the legislative intent behind the statute:" After reviewing the
Rehabilitation Act in the context of the enactment of Massachusetts state
law, the guidance offered by the Massachusetts Commission Against
Discrimination, and the fact that the Massachusetts Legislature intended a
liberal construction of the anti-discrimination statute, the Supreme Judicial
Court decided against considering mitigating measures when assessing
whether an individual suffers from a disability under state law. 37'
The court offered two reasons for a more liberal interpretation of the
Massachusetts state law than the Supreme Court's construction of the ADA
in Sutton.31' First, unlike the EEOC, which did not have the authority to
implement regulations interpreting or implementing the generally
applicable ADA provisions, the Massachusetts Commission Against
Discrimination had such authority with respect to the Massachusetts
statute.373 As a result, its interpretation of the state statute (which required
courts to ignore mitigating measures when determining disability status)
was entitled to deference.374 Also, unlike the ADA, which indicated that
forty-three million Americans suffered from disabilities, the Massachusetts
statute did not indicate a specific number of individuals targeted by the
statute, and therefore the court did not find legislative intent to limit the
state statute's application.37 ' Because of these factors, the court rejected the
Sutton approach and determined that mitigating measures should not be
considered when determining disability status under Massachusetts law.376
Of course, the Supreme Judicial Court pointed out that this determination
did not answer the ultimate question in these disability discrimination cases:
whether the plaintiff can ably perform the essential functions of the position
with or without a reasonable accommodation.377
determination), while the plaintiff argued that the court should reject that very narrow
interpretation and ignore mitigating measures. See id.
370. Id. at 960.
371. Id. at 960-63.
372. Id. at 963-64.
373. Id. at 963. The specific authority-granting provisions of the Massachusetts anti-
discrimination statute are §§ 2-3 of Massachusetts General Laws ch. 151 B. See MASS. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 15IB, §§ 2-3 (West 2004).
374. Dahill, 748 N.E.2d at 961-62.
375. Id. at 963.
376. Id. at 963-64. See also Antonsen v. Ward, 571 N.E.2d 636 (N.Y. 1991). There, the
Court of Appeals of New York concluded that an employee with Crohn's disease satisfied the
statute's definition of "disability." Id. at 639. However, the relevant definition of "disability"
in Antonsen was much more liberal than the ADA's definition of "disability" because it did
not require a substantial limitation on a major life activity. See id. at 639. Specifically, the
relevant statute defined "disability" as "a physical or mental impairment, a record of such an
impairment or a condition regarded by others as an impairment." Id.
377. Dahill, 748 N.E.2d at 964.
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Therefore, when a victim of colitis or Crohn's disease, or any disease for
that matter, attempts to bring a disability-based discrimination lawsuit
against a former or current employer, he should also investigate the
applicable state anti-discrimination statute. Although most courts interpret
state statutes in a manner consistent with Sutton, the Dahill opinion might
assist potential plaintiffs to argue more persuasively for different
interpretations of state and federal statutes. While this strategy does
nothing to broaden the scope of the ADA, or to increase the likelihood of
success in an ADA claim, it might supply a more viable approach to
recovery.
If state law remedies also prove difficult for plaintiffs to establish
disabilities, these individuals might have some additional remedies under
federal law. Specifically, they might pursue federal disability benefits under
the Social Security Act,378 or pursue a claim under the Family Medical
Leave Act of 1993."79 Although these federal statutes have distinct
requirements and different possible benefits; they might provide some
relief to individuals suffering from these illnesses who cannot find any
protection under the ADA. Therefore, all potential ADA plaintiffs must
consider filing state law claims as well as claims brought under other federal
statutes. Although this will not help broaden the protection afforded by the
ADA, it might provide much needed relief to individuals suffering from
these illnesses.
B. Take a More Serious Look at "Home Work"
As discussed in Part III.B, even though some plaintiffs are able to
convince courts that they have a disability under the ADA or its state-law
equivalent, they still lose their cases because they can not establish that they
are qualified individuals with a disability. One possible way to perhaps be
more successful on this issue is to convince the federal courts that working
at home is a reasonable accommodation worthy of more careful
exploration. 8' With technology making this a more attractive and feasible
possibility, courts might be more inclined to consider this option in these
types of ADA cases. If courts become more willing to consider "home
work" as a reasonable accommodation under the ADA, plaintiffs will be
better able to prove their status as qualified individuals with disabilities, and
thus be more successful when bringing ADA actions. Although the "home
378. 42 U.S.C. § 423 (2000).
379. 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654 (2000).
380. See 42 U.S.C. § 423 (2000); 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654 (2000).
381. As was mentioned earlier, the C.F.R. provides examples of reasonable
accommodations such as job restructuring, modified work schedules, and transfers to vacant
positions. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2 (o)(2).
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work" approach failed in some of the cases previously discussed in this
3812Article, the possibility was raised by the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of New York in Harris v. Chater."' Although Harris
was not a case brought under the ADA, the opinion raises the possibility of
"home work" as an available option more employers (and employees)
should consider.'m In Harris, the Social Security Commissioner was
appealing the reversal of a determination that the plaintiff was not entitled
to Social Security disability benefits."" The claimant suffered from a severe
case of Crohn's disease, among other impairments, and attempted to
receive disability benefits.3 6 After determining that the commissioner did
not properly follow established rules for determining entitlement, the court
concluded that the plaintiff was entitled to the benefits:
Most relevant to the issue raised in this section of this Article was the
court's discussion of "home work" as an option for employees unable to
function in a traditional workplace." Although the court addressed this
issue in the context of Social Security disability benefits, the court's
discussion emphasized how employers could utilize "disabled" employees in
non-traditional ways.389 In addition to listing the types of jobs an individual
such as the plaintiff could perform at home (internet research,
telemarketing, editing, and data entry), the court also noted, "private
employers may not be fully accessing the rich resource of home-bound
persons seeking employment. ''390 Perhaps employers who more fully
explored this possibility would see this type of arrangement as a reasonable
accommodation under the ADA.39' Therefore, if courts willingly broaden
the concept of reasonable accommodation, this "home work" approach will
382. See Nesser v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 160 F.3d 442,445-46 (8th Cir. 1998); Davis v.
Guardian Life Ins. Co., No. Civ. A. 98-5209, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 719, at *12-16 (E.D. Pa.
Feb. 1, 2000).
383. 998 F. Supp. 223 (E.D.N.Y. 1998).
384. Id. at 228. One of the other issues raised in Harris was whether an employee's
assertion that he is unable to work (for purposes of obtaining Social Security benefits) should
disqualify him from arguing that he is a qualified individual with a disability under the ADA.
Id. at 228-29. The Supreme Court has since resolved that issue, concluding that those two
positions are not mutually exclusive and that Social Security claimants who assert an inability
to work are not necessarily precluded from arguing that they are qualified individuals with
disabilities under the ADA. Cleveland v. Policy Mgmt. Sys. Corp. 526 U.S. 795 (1999).
385. Harris, 998 F. Supp. at 223-24.
386. Id. at 224.
387. Id. at 227.
388. Id. at 227-28.
389. Id. at 228.
390. Id.
391. Of course, this could result in a double-edged sword because the increased acceptance
of "home work" might make it even more difficult for an ADA plaintiff to prove a substantial
limitation in the ability to work.
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allow more ADA plaintiffs with gastrointestinal illnesses to prove that they
can perform the essential functions of their jobs with a reasonable
accommodation, and thus experience more success in asserting their ADA
claims.
In fact, some plaintiffs actually have been successful in arguing that
"home work" should qualify as an acceptable form of a reasonable
accommodation. In a case brought under the Rehabilitation Act, the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held
that genuine issues of fact remained, and therefore summary judgment was
inappropriate, in a case involving an individual with multiple sclerosis who
requested to work at home.9 In Langon v. Department of Health and
Human Services, the plaintiff, a computer programmer, sued her former
employer after she was denied a promotion and ultimately fired from her
position. 9' Once the plaintiff exhausted her administrative remedies, she
brought suit in the United States District Court for the District of
Columbia. 94 The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the
employer, and the plaintiff appealed.' 9' In reversing the summary judgment,
the D.C. Circuit found genuine issues of material fact about whether the
plaintiff could have performed her job at home, and whether working at
396home was a reasonable accommodation.
Although Langon does not stand for the proposition that working at
home is always a reasonable accommodation, it demonstrates a court's
willingness to at least consider this alternative. As technology improves,
this option will become a greater possibility. Unfortunately for ADA
plaintiffs, not all courts are as willing to explore this "home work" option
when considering disability claims. 39 However, plaintiffs who must stay
392. Langon v. Dep't of Health and Human Servs., 959 F.2d 1053, 1054 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
393. id. at 1054-56. As a result of her condition, the plaintiff was absent from work quite
often, an issue that caused "disruption" at the plaintiff's place of employment. Id. at 1054.
Eventually, because of her illness, the plaintiff requested several accommodations, including
permission to work at home. Id. Although the plaintiff's supervisor granted some of the
plaintiff's requests, he denied her the opportunity to work at home. Id. at 1055. The
employer's personnel director was aware that in some circumstances working at home was
considered a reasonable accommodation, but he claimed he needed additional information to
determine whether the plaintiff was entitled to such an accommodation. Id. Despite receiving
more medical information, the plaintiff's supervisor still denied her request, this time because
the plaintiff's job was not one that lended itself to working at home. Id.
394. Id. at 1056.
395. Id. The district court's opinion can be found at 749 F. Supp. I (D.D.C. 1990).
396. Langon, 959 F.2d at 1060-61.
397. See, e.g., Nesser v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 160 F.3d 442, 446 (8th Cir. 1998)
(deciding not to address whether an employer's denial of an employee's request to work at
home constituted an ADA violation); Vande Zande v. Wis. Dep't of Admin., 44 F.3d 538, 544-
45 (7th Cir. 1995) (holding that no reasonable jury could have concluded that working at home
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home as a result of their disabilities and can efficiently and effectively work
at home should continue to assert this as a reasonable accommodation for
their disabilities. This is yet one more approach ADA plaintiffs can use to
try to be successful in their cases.
VII. CONCLUSION
Originally praised as a "landmark" piece of legislation, the ADA has not
provided relief for many individuals who suffer from various "hidden"
illnesses, including colitis and Crohn's disease. Although this Article
focused on individuals with gastrointestinal disorders, plaintiffs with all
types of illnesses have difficulty pursuing claims under the ADA. These
plaintiffs fall into the all-too-common dilemma of either being "not sick
enough" and therefore not having a disability under the Act, or being "too
sick," and therefore not being a qualified individual with a disability under
the ADA.
In order to improve their likelihood of obtaining some type of relief for
the adverse employment actions caused by their illnesses, plaintiffs must
pursue other potential avenues. One approach might encourage courts or
Congress to expand the definition of disability, but that seems unlikely in
light of the federal courts' opinions on this issue, and Congress' lack of a
response in these pro-employer opinions. As a result, plaintiffs will either
have to seek other federal remedies under laws such as the Family Medical
Leave Act or the Social Security Act, or seek remedies under more
favorable state laws that prohibit disability discrimination.
Another option ADA plaintiffs might pursue is to attempt to broaden the
scope of what constitutes a reasonable accommodation under the ADA.
Specifically, if ADA plaintiffs can convince courts and employers of the
benefits of "home work," some ADA plaintiffs will be able to prove that
they can perform the essential functions of their jobs with a reasonable
accommodation. With increased technology, this alternative to a traditional
workplace will protect some ADA plaintiffs who otherwise cannot attend
work on a regular basis. This is especially true for people with colitis and
Crohn's disease, who often must stay at home because of the effects of their
illnesses.
As this Article has demonstrated, the ADA has been ineffective in
helping individuals with "hidden" diseases such as colitis and Crohn's
disease enter or remain in the workforce. Although this legislation certainly
has opened some doors to people previously excluded from the workforce,
the Act has left many others still looking for a way to enter the "bright new
era of equality, independence, and freedom" President Bush promised
was a reasonable accommodation, and acknowledging that employers are typically not
required to grant such an accommodation).
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when signing the ADA into law.398 Unless and until Congress acts to change
the pro-employer momentum created by the federal courts, or until the
judicial hostility toward the ADA subsides, the likelihood that plaintiffs
suffering from gastrointestinal disorders such as colitis and Crohn's disease
will enter this "bright new era of equality" remains extremely remote.
398. Bush, supra note 5. Bush called on the ADA to be the door to a "bright new era of
equality, independence, and freedom" when he signed the ADA.
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